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Abstract
We study private matrix analysis in the sliding window model where only the lastW updates to matri-
ces are considereduseful for analysis. We give first efficient o(W) space differentially private algorithms for
spectral approximation, principal component analysis, and linear regression. We also initiate and show ef-
ficient differentially private algorithms for two important variants of principal component analysis: sparse
principal component analysis and non-negative principal component analysis. Prior to our work, no such
result was known for sparse and non-negative differentially private principal component analysis even
in the static data setting. These algorithms are obtained by identifying sufficient conditions on positive
semidefinite matrices formed from streamed matrices. We also show a lower bound on space required
to compute low-rank approximation even if the algorithm gives multiplicative approximation and incurs
additive error. This follows via reduction to a certain communication complexity problem.
∗Joined Apple subsequent to the finalization of this work.
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1 Introduction
An n × d matrix provides a natural structure for encoding information about n data points, each with d
features. Such representation manifests itself in many ways, such as financial transactions, asset manage-
ment, recommendation system, social networks, machine, and learning kernels. As a result, a large body
of work has focused on matrix analysis and its application in statistical data analysis, scientific computing,
and machine learning [DM17, Dur91, Lew96, PGH+04, PTVF07, SL02, Sch91, Sch16, SF73, Woo14].
There has been a paradigm shift in statistical analysis (including matrix analysis) in the era of big data.
Two aspects that have become increasingly important from a technical viewpoint are (i) protecting sensitive
information and (ii) the increasing frequency with which data is being continuously updated. Instances
that illustrate the importance of these two aspects are investment strategies (across a variety of financial
assets) in a financial firm. The strategies rely on matrix analysis of financial data that get continuously
updated. Most of these strategies make use of “recent data" as opposed to the entire history. This heuristic
is rooted in the empirical observation that recent data are better predictors of the future behavior of assets
than older data [MCTJ13, Tsa05], a theme also found in many other applications of matrix analysis as
well [CDC14, Kor09, QCJ18]. Moreover, the strategies are sensitive and have to be kept private. On the
contrary, it is well documented that performing statistical analysis, including matrix analysis, accurately
can leak private information [BDK07, DSSU17, CN18, GAM18, KMN05, NS06, SSSS17].
Accomplishing matrix analysis has been widely studied when the entire historical data is taken into ac-
count [DM17, Woo14]. However, one cannot utilize these techniques in the more restrictive scenario where
a collection of the most recent updates on data is pertinent for analysis. This is even more challenging
when one wishes that the analysis also satisfies a privacy guarantee. Known privacy preserving algorithms
for matrix analysis give provable guarantees under a robust privacy guarantee known as differential privacy
(see, for example, [ADK+19, BDMN05, DTTZ14, KT13, MM09, HP14, HR12, Upa18, WWS15, ZLW09]),
but they are not adaptable to above setting. In contrast, the current practical deployment of private al-
gorithms [DKY17, EPK14, HMA+17, KAZA17, TVV+17a, TVV+17b] favors using only recent data for a
variety of reasons.
In the view of this, we focus on a rigorous study of privacy-preserving matrix analysis in the sliding
window model of privacy [BFM+13, CLSX12, Upa19]. The model is parameterized by the window size, W,
and assumes that the data arrives in the form of (possibly infinite) stream over time. An analyst is required
to perform the analysis only on the W most recent streams of data (usually referred to as a sliding window)
using o(W) space. The privacy guarantee, on the other hand, is for the entire historical data, i.e., even if the
data is not in the current window, its privacy should not be compromised.
We demonstrate o(W) space private algorithms for several matrix analysis problems in the sliding win-
dow model (see, Table 1). A succinct overview of our main contributions are as follows.
1. We show that the spectral histogram framework used in the non-private setting for o(W) space algo-
rithm [BDM+20] is too stringent for privacy and resulting algorithms and analysis are not robust
to noise required for privacy1. That is, we show rigorously that the constraint imposed by spectral
histogram only permits sub-optimally accurate algorithms when privacy is a concern (Appendix C).
2. We propose a relaxation of spectral histogram property on a set of positive semidefinite matrices
and show that it suffices for private matrix analysis. We call this relaxation the approximate spectral
histogram property. We design an efficient data structure that maintains the approximate spectral
histogram property on a set of positive semidefinite matrices while preserving differential privacy
(Section 3) under the assumption that entries of the streamed rows are polynomially bounded.
3. We use approximate spectral histogram property to efficiently and optimally solve several matrix
analysis problems privately in the sliding window model. The problems we consider are (i) spectral
approximation, (ii) principal component analysis (PCA), (iii) directional variance queries, and (iv)
generalized linear regression. We also study constrained PCA [CEM+15], and give a sublinear space
1The online version of potential barrier [CMP16] has been used in the sliding window setting [BDM+20]; however, such techniques
are not useful under privacy constraints. In these techniques, the sampling probability of a row at any time depends on which other
rows are sampled previously. These sampling probabilities are not Lipschitz and highly correlated, so it is not clear how to make it
private – simply adding a high variance noise either results in a bound worse than the trivial additive error. Using a rough estimate
of leverage score as done in Arora and Upadhyay [AU19] also leads to a sub-optimal bounds for matrix analysis.
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Privacy Additive error Space required Reference
η-spectral approximation (ǫ, δ)-DP O
(
r2 log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
1d O
(
r2d
η logW
)
Theorem 3, 4
PCA (ǫ, δ)-DP O
(√
kd log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
O
(
dk2
η3
logW
)
Theorem 6
Sparse and Non-negative PCA (ǫ, δ)-DP O
(√
kd log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
O
(
dk2
η3
logW
)
Theorem 7
Squared linear regression (ǫ, δ)-DP O
(
d
(
d+
log(1/δ)
ǫ
))
O
(
d3
η logW
)
Theorem 8
Directional variance query (ǫ, δ)-DP O
(
d
(
d+
log(1/δ)
ǫ
))
O
(
d3
η logW
)
Theorem 15
Table 1: Results presented in this paper (W: window size, k : target rank, d : dimension of streamed row,
and ǫ, δ are privacy parameters, 1d is a d× d identity matrix, r: rank of streamed matrix).
private algorithm for it. This generalizes many variants of PCA studied in statistical machine learning
such as sparse PCA and non-negative PCA [APD14, dGJL05, YZ13, ZS07] (see Table 1).
4. Finally, we exhibit limitations of private matrix analysis by giving a lower bound on differentially
private algorithm for low-rank approximation in the sliding window model (Appendix E).
Conceptually, approximate spectral histogram property can be viewed as a generalization of subspace em-
bedding property [CW17]. This allows us to use approximate spectral histogram property in the sliding win-
dow model in the same way as subspace embedding is employed in the general streaming model [Woo14]
even in the context of privacy [BBDS12, Upa18]. Given the wide array of applications of subspace embed-
ding, we believe that the notion of approximate spectral histogram will have further applications in the
sliding window model of privacy.
One may ask why we need to introduce approximate spectral histogram property in the sliding window
model of privacy. We end this section with a discussion on this. Let us consider the spectral approximation
of matrices. There is one private algorithm [BBDS12] which relies on subspace embedding. This algorithm
explicitly computes the singular value decomposition of the matrix making it suitable only for static data
matrix. Moreover, we cannot revert the effect of the row streamed beyond the current position of the
window.
Finally, we cannot just take an off-the-shelf algorithm, add an appropriately scaled noise matrix to pre-
serve privacy, and get a non-trivial utility guarantee for downstream matrix analysis. For the start, the
standard noise mechanism, like the Gaussian mechanism would result in a matrix that is not a positive
semidefinite matrix. If we instead use the projection trick of Arora and Upadhyay [ABU18], it would incur
error that scales with the dimension and would have an inefficient update time. Likewise, adding a noise
matrix that is a positive semidefinite matrix would incur error linear in dimension. We explore this in more
detail in Appendix C. The known space-efficient algorithm [BDM+20] performs sampling using the lever-
age score. As a result, the effect of a single row in the matrix formed by this sampling procedure can be
arbitrarily large, and consequently, leading to a trivial utility guarantee. In fact, one can show that the lever-
age score for a row can change arbitrarily using Meyer’s result [Mey73]. It is also not clear if we can even
use the exponential mechanism to sample rows because it is not clear how to adapt it to a sliding window
setting and for the natural score functions, one can construct counterexamples where the sensitivity of the
score function is also large. This is in addition to the question regarding the efficiency of the update stage.
1.1 Differential privacy under sliding window model
We consider a matrix AW ∈ RW×d that is formed incrementally through a stream of d-dimensional row
vectors (aT)T≥1. At the start, the matrix AW(0) is an all zero matrix and its state at time T is
AW(T) :=

a1
...
aT
0(W−T)×d
 if T ≤ W, else AW(T) :=

aT−W+1
...
aT−1
aT
 . (1)
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We fix the symbolW to denote the window size and use the notation AW to denote AW(T) whenever it
is clear from the context. At any time T, we are interested in performing different types of analysis on the
matrix AW , such as PCA and its variants, linear regression, etc.
We now formalize the privacy model. We adhere to the neighboring relation used in many works
studying matrix analysis in static setting [BBDS12, HR12, DTTZ14, She19], in online setting [DTTZ14], and
streaming setting [Upa18]. To this end, for any T > 0, consider the following set of T × dmatrices:
N :=
{
B ∈ RT×d : ∃i ∈ [T] such that ‖B[i :]‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖B[j :]‖2 = 0 for all j 6= i
}
,
where B[i :] denotes the i-th row of the matrix B and ‖B[i :]‖2 denote its Euclidean norm.
In privacy literature, there are two well-studied levels of granularity when the data arrives in an online
manner [ABU18, BFM+13, CSS11, CLSX12, DNP+10, DR14, MMNW11, Upa18, Upa19]: (i) user-level privacy,
where two streams are neighboring if they differ in a single user’s data; and (ii) event-level privacy, where
two streams are neighboring if they differ in one-time epoch. We follow previous works on private analysis
in the sliding window model [BFM+13, CLSX12, Upa19] and consider event-level privacy as our notion of
privacy. We say that two streams are neighboring if, at any time T > 0, they form matrices AT and A′T such
that AT − A′T ∈ N. We now define the privacy notion.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy under sliding window model [BFM+13, CLSX12, Upa19]). For ǫ ≥ 0, δ ∈
[0, 1], we say a randomized algorithm R with range Y is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private in the sliding window model if for
any T > 0, for every two matrices AT and A′T formed by neighboring streams, and for all measurable subsets, S ⊆ Y,
Pr[M(AT) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[M(A′T) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probability is taken over the private coin tosses of the algorithm M.
Note that the privacy guarantee is for the entire stream, i.e., even if the data has expired, its privacy is
not lost. However, accuracy is required only for the last W updates. This is in accordance with previous
works.
1.2 Our techniques
Our main goal is to privately compute (η, ζ)-spectral approximation, which is defined as follows. Given
parameters η, ζ ≥ 0 and a matrix AW ∈ RW×d, find a postive semidefinite matrix S ∈ Rd×d, such that
(1− η)A⊤WAW − ζ1d  S  (1+ η)A⊤WAW + ζ1d.
Here the partial order C  D between symmetric matrices C and Dmeans that D− C is a positive semidef-
inite matrix, and the parameter ζ ≥ 0 is the distortion in the spectrum that we are willing to accept to
preserve privacy. Ideally, we would like these parameters to be as small as possible.
A naive algorithm, Apriv, for private spectral approximation is to store a set of w = min {W, T} positive
semidefinite matrices at any time T, where the i-th matrix in this set is a sanitized version of the matrix
formed by the last i updates. Apriv requiresO(wd2) space. Our main conceptual contribution is a framework
for private matrix analysis in the sliding window model with significantly less space and better accuracy.
To this end, we introduce η-approximate spectral histogram property for a set of positive semidefinite matrices
and timestamps. We will occasionally refer to such a set as a data structure for the remainder of this section.
Let AW be the matrix formed by the window W. Let S˜i denote an (
η
4 , 0)-spectral approximation of Si,
i.e., (1− η/4)S˜i  Si  (1+ η/4)S˜i. Roughly speaking, a data structure D satisfies η-approximate spectral
histogram property (rigorously defined in Definition 3) if there exists an ℓ = poly(d, logW), such that D
consists of ℓ timestamps t1 < · · · < tℓ and PSD matrices S˜ℓ  · · ·  S˜1 such that
∀i ∈ [ℓ], (1− η)Si  Si+1; ∀i ∈ [ℓ− 2],
(
1− η
2
)
S˜i 6 S˜i+2; and t2 ≤ T −W + 1 ≤ t1, (2)
where A 6 B implies that B − A is not a positive semidefinite matrix. Note that the above definition
relaxes the condition in Braverman et al. [BDM+20] because we allow a spectral approximation of the
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corresponding original matrix. This relaxation allows us to deal with the perturbation required for privacy
without losing on the accuracy. In other words, the relaxation allows us to be more robust to the noise.
The first two conditions are required to get the desirable space bound, while the first and third condi-
tions are required to demonstrate the accuracy guarantee. When it is clear from context, we call such a set of
matrices as the one satisfying the η-approximate spectral histogram property. For the ease of presentation
in this overview, we focus on the case when the output is produced just once at the end of the stream.
It is important that ℓ is small at any time T.We first show that, if the rank of the matrix AW is r, then
ℓ = O
(
r
η logW
)
. By the first two properties in Equation 2, there is at least one singular value that decreases
by a factor of (1− η2 ) in every successive timestamp. We will later see that our privacy mechanism ensures
that the spectrum of any matrix S˜i is lower bounded by a constant. Since every update has bounded entries,
there can be at most ℓ := O
(
r log1− η2 (W)
)
= O
(
r
η log(W)
)
matrices satisfying η-approximate spectral
histogram. The question we answer next is how to maintain such a set of matrices while preserving privacy.
As mentioned in the introduction, we cannot just take off-the-shelf algorithm [BDM+20] and add noise
matrix to preserve privacy as well as the utility. To preserve privacy so that we can also get meaningful
utility, when a new row aT+1 ∈ Rd is streamed, we first update ST to get S′T+1 as follows. We first add a
sketch of aT+1 to every matrix in ST to obtain an updated set S′T. We then privatize aT+1 to get a matrix
Aℓ+1 and define S′T+1 := S′T ∪ Aℓ+1. For privacy mechanism, we use a variant of Johnson-Lindenstrauss
mechanism [BBDS12] first proposed in Upadhyay [Upa14] and extended in Sheffet [She19] and Upad-
hyay [Upa18].
Now the set {S⊤S : S ∈ S′T+1} may not satisfy η-approximate spectral histogram property. In the next
phase, we greedily remove matrices if they do not satisfy any of the desired properties of η-approximate
spectral histogram property (Algorithm 3). In this phase, the most computationally expensive part of
the algorithm is to find if PSD ordering is violated. For this step, we can use known PSD testing algo-
rithms [BCJ20]. Such greedy approach is reminiscent of the potential barrier method [BSS12] to compute
spectral sparsification of aW × dmatrix. In the potential barrier method, we remove a large subset of rank-
one matrices and show that only storing Θ
(
dη−2
)
rank-one matrices suffices for η-spectral sparsification.
In fact, two key technical features distinguish our method from theirs. In their setting, all PSD matrices
are rank-one matrices; whereas we have W positive semidefinite matrices that may have different ranks
(not necessarily rank-one). The second crucial point is that we aim to significantly reduce the number of
matrices stored for our application. This makes maintaining our data structure much more complicated
than the potential barrier method.
In contrast to the non-private algorithm, for the accuracy proof, we now have to deal with the spectral
approximation of the streamedmatrix along with the perturbation required to preserve privacy. As suchwe
cannot use previous analysis and have to bemore carefulwhen dealing with the privatizedmatrices. One of
the subtle reason is that the utility proof of previous analysis relied on the fact that the checkpoints survived
previous deletion, where the deletion criterion relies on the exact covariance matrix of the streamed matrix,
while in our case, it depends on the spectral approximation of privatized streamed matrix.
We now give an overview of how η-approximate spectral histogram property allows us to output a
spectral approximation of the matrix AW . Let S˜1, . . . , S˜ℓ be the set of matrices satisfying η-approximate
spectral histogram property. From the third condition of Equation 2, we have S2  A⊤WAW  S1. The
first condition of Equation 2 implies that (1− η)S1  S2. Combined with the fact that S1 and S2 are a η4 -
spectral approximation of S˜1 and S˜2, respectively, this implies that S˜1 is a spectral approximation of AW . The
accuracy proof becomes more subtle because of the noise introduced for privacy. We cannot use previous
analysis because they do not extend to the perturbation required for privacy. Intuitively, the additive term
in our spectral approximation is due to the noise introduced by employing privacy mechanisms. We show
the following:
Theorem 1 (Informal version of Theorem 4). Let AW ∈ RW×d be a rank-r matrix formed by the current window.
Then there is an efficient (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm under sliding window model that uses O
(
dr2
η2
logW
)
space and outputs a PSD matrix S at the end of the stream such that
(1− η)A⊤WAW − ν log ν1d  S  (1+ η)A⊤WAW + ν log ν1d, where ν = O
(
d log2 (1/δ)
ǫ2
)
.
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In the static setting, using the result of Sarlos [Sar06] and Blocki et al. [BBDS12]2, we can get an O(d2)
space private algorithm which is also an
(
η, d log(1/δ)
ǫ2η
)
-spectral approximation algorithm. There is a non-
private spectral approximation algorithm in the sliding window model that usesO
(
rd
η logW
)
space under
bounded condition number of the matrix [BDM+20]. In many practical scenarios, r = O(1), in which case
we do not pay any price for preserving privacy. Some example where this is the case is in privacy preserving
learning, where the dimension d of the parameter space is large but the gradients of the loss function ℓ are
empirically observed to be contained in a low-dimensional subspace of Rd [GARD18, LGZ+20, Pap19].
One main application of Theorem 1 is the principal component analysis and its variants. Principal com-
ponent analysis is an extensively used subroutine in many applications like clustering [CEM+15, McS01],
data mining [AFK+01], recommendation systems [DKR02], information retrieval [PTRV98], and learning
distributions [AM05]. In these applications, given a matrix A ∈ Rn×d and a target rank k, the goal is to
output a rank-k orthonormal projection matrix P ∈ Rd×d such that
‖A− AP‖F ≤ (1+ η) min
rank(X)≤k
‖A− X‖F + ζ.
The goal here is to minimize ζ for a given k, d, and privacy parameters ǫ and δ. In many applications,
instead of optimizing over all rank-k projection matrices, we are required to optimize over a smaller set
of projection matrices, such as one with only non-negative entries. In particular, let Π be any set of rank-
k projection matrices (not necessarily set of all rank-k projection matrices). Then the restricted principal
component analysis is to find P∗ = argminP∈Π ‖A− AP‖2F .
A naive application of approximate spectral histogram property to solve PCA will lead to an additive
error that depends linearly on the rank of the streamedmatrix. To solve these problems optimally, we intro-
duce an intermediate problem that we call private projection preserving summary (Definition 4). This problem
can be seen as a private analogue of projection-cost preserving sketches [CEM+15]. Solving this problem
ensures that the additive error incurred is small. We consider the first k/η spectrum of the streamed ma-
trix and show that it suffices for our purpose. That is, let A˜1, · · · , A˜ℓ be matrices such that its covariance
matrices S˜1, · · · , S˜ℓ satisfy η-approximate spectral histogram property. We show that random projection of
A˜1, · · · , A˜ℓ to a k/η dimensional linear subspace suffices. Let πk/η(A˜1), · · · ,πk/η(A˜ℓ) be these projected
matrices. We show that the set of covariance matrices corresponding to πk/η(A˜1), · · · ,πk/η(A˜ℓ) satisfy the
approximate spectral histogram property. Using this, we show that the first matrix, A˜ := πk/η(A˜1), in this
set is a private projection preserving summary for AW with a small additive error.
Theorem 2 (Informal version of Theorem 7). Let AW be the matrix formed by last W updates and Π be a given
set of rank-k projection matrices. Then there is an efficient (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm that outputs a matrix
P ∈ Π at the end of the stream, such that if ‖A˜(1d − P)‖F ≤ γ ·minX∈Π ‖A˜(1d − X)‖F for some γ > 0, then
‖AW(1d − P)‖F ≤ (1+ η) γ ·min
X∈Π ‖AW(1d − X)‖F +O
(
1
ǫ
√
kd log(1/δ)
)
.
The matrix P in the above result can be computed using any known non-private algorithm and there
are existing results for structured projection matrices (for example, [APD14, dGJL05, PDK13, YZ13, ZS07]).
In particular, if Π is a set of sparse or non-negative projection matrices, then the theorem gives a way to
solve these problems privately. We remark that Theorem 7 also implies a private algorithm for principal
component analysis by using algorithms for PCA that achieves γ = 1 [EY36].
Using a reduction to the linear reconstruction attack [DN03], Hardt and Roth [HR12] showed that any
private (not necessarily differentially private) algorithm for PCA would incur an additive error of order
Ω(
√
kd). We achieve asymptotically tight accuracy bound even in the sliding window model up to poly-
logarithmic factor for ǫ = O(1) and δ = Θ(d− log d). A comprehensive comparison of our result with
previous (non-sliding window) algorithms is presented in Table 2. From the table, one can see that we
improve (or match) previous bounds even though we work in a more restrictive setting.
2The output of Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] does not provide spectral approximation because their output is not a PSD.
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Additive Error Multiplicative? Space Required Comments
Hardt-Roth [HR12] O˜
(
ǫ−1k‖A‖∞
√
n
) √
O(d2) Static data
Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] O˜
(
ǫ−1k
√
d
)
× O˜ (d2) Static data
Upadhyay [Upa18] O˜
(
ǫ−1
√
kd
) √
O˜
(
η−1dk
)
Streaming data
Lower Bound Ω
(√
kd
)
[HR12]
√
Ω
(
η−1dk logW
)
Sliding window
This Paper O˜
(
ǫ−1
√
kd
) √
O˜
(
η−3dk2 logW
)
Sliding window
Table 2: Comparison of
(
ǫ,Θ
(
d− log d
))
-Differentially private PCA results (our results are in red).
We finally remark that we do not violate the lower bound of Dwork et al. [DTTZ14]. Their lower bound
holds when there is no multiplicative approximation.We only use O
(
dk2
η3
logW
)
space in the sliding win-
dow setting, which is an improvement whenever k logW/η3 = o(d). Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] also studied
PCA in the online learning model [Haz19], which is incomparable to the sliding window model3.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We use the notation R to denote the space of real numbers and N to denote the set of natural numbers. For
n ∈ N, we let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
Linear algebra. The space of n-dimensional vectors over reals is denoted Rn. The set of non-negative
vectors (also known as non-negative orthant) and the set of strictly positive vectors in Rn are denoted Rn+
and Rn++, respectively. For a vector x, we let x
⊤ denote the transpose of the vector. We reserve the letters
x, y, z to denote real vectors. The entries of a vector x ∈ Rn is denoted as follows:
x =
(
x[1], x[2], · · · , x[n])⊤.
We let {e¯i : i ∈ [n]} (where [n] := {1, 2, · · · , n}) denote the set of standard basis vectors of Rn. That is,
e¯i[j] =
{
1 if i = j,
0 if i 6= j.
We let the vector of all 1’s denoted by e¯, i.e., e¯ = e¯1 + e¯2 + · · ·+ e¯n. For two vectors x, y ∈ Rn, their inner
product is denoted 〈x, y〉 and is defined as
〈x, y〉 :=
n
∑
i=1
x[i]y[i].
The set of real n× m matrices is denoted Rn×m. For a real matrix A, the (i, j) entry of it is denoted A[i, j]
and its transpose is denoted A⊤. The following special classes of matrices are relevant to this paper.
1. A real matrix A ∈ Rn×n is symmetric if A = A⊤. The set of symmetric matrices is denoted Sn and forms
a vector space over R. The eigenvalues of symmetric matrices are real.
2. A symmetric matrix A ∈ Sn is positive semidefinite if all of its eigenvalues are non-negative. The set
of such matrices is denoted Sn+. The notation A  0 indicates that A is positive semidefinite and the
notations A  B and B  A indicate that A− B  0 for symmetric matrices A and B. We also use the
notation A 6 B and B 6 A for A, B ∈ Sn to say that A− B 6∈ Sn+.
3The online learning model is a game between a decision-maker and an adversary. The decision-maker makes decisions iteratively.
After committing to a decision, it suffers a loss. These losses can be adversarially chosen, and even depend on the action taken by the
decision-maker. The goal is to minimize the total loss in retrospect to the best decision the decision-maker should have taken.
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3. A positive semidefinite matrix A ∈ Sn+ is positive definite if all of its eigenvalues are strictly positive. The
set of such matrices is denoted Sn++. The notation A ≻ 0 indicates that A is positive definite and the
notations A ≻ B and B ≺ A indicate that A− B ≻ 0 for symmetric matrices A and B.
4. A matrix U ∈ Rn×n is orthonormal if UU⊤ = U⊤U = 1n, where 1n is the identity matrix. We will drop
the subscript n from 1n when the dimension is understood from the context.
5. A symmetric matrix P ∈ Sn is a rank-k orthogonal projection matrix if it satisfies P2 = P and it’s rank is k.
Such matrices have eigenvalues 0 and 1. A projection matrix that is not orthogonal is called an oblique
projection matrix.
The eigenvalues of any symmetric matrix A ∈ Sn are denoted by (λ1(A), . . . , λn(A)) sorted from largest
to smallest: λ1(A) ≥ λ2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ λn(A). When discussing the largest and smallest eigenvalues, we
alternately use the notation λmax(A) and λmin(A) to denote λ1(A) and λn(A), respectively. Similarly, the
singular values of A is denoted by the tuple (s1(A), . . . , sn(A)) sorted from largest to smallest: s1(A) ≥
s2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ sn(A). We use the notation smax(A) and smin(A) to denote the largest and smallest singular
values of A, respectively. It is a well known fact that for any symmetric matrix A
smax(A) = max {|λmax(A)|, |λmin(A)|} and smin(A) = min {|λmax(A)|, |λmin(A)|} .
The maximum number of non-zero singular values of A ∈ Rn×m is min{n,m}. The spectral norm of a matrix
A ∈ Rn×m is defined as
‖A‖2 = max{‖Ax‖2 : x ∈ Rm, ‖x‖2 = 1}.
The spectral norm of A is equal to the largest singular value of A. The trace norm of a rank-r symmetric
matrix A is defined as the sum of its singular values.
‖A‖1 :=
r
∑
i=1
|si(A)|.
The Frobenius norm of a matrix A is defined as
‖A‖F :=
(
∑
ij
|A[i, j]|2
)1/2
.
It is well known that the Frobenius norm of a rank-r matrix A is
‖A‖F :=
(
r
∑
i=1
|si(A)|2
)1/2
.
This directly implies that ‖A‖2F = Tr
(
A⊤A
)
for any n× d matrix A.
Two types of matrix decomposition are used in this paper. The first matrix decomposition is spectral
decomposition (or eigenvalue decomposition). It means that a symmetric matrix A ∈ Sn can be written as
A = UΛU⊤ =
n
∑
i=1
λi(A)xix
⊤
i
whereU is an orthonormal matrix, Λ is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues of A on its diagonal, and the set
{xi ∈ Rn : i ∈ [n]} are set of orthonormal vectors known as eigenvectors of A. We note that orthonormal
matrices can also be decomposed in above form. The second matrix decomposition that is relevant to this
paper is singular value decomposition (or SVD for short). Any real matrix A ∈ Rn×d can be decomposed as
follows:
A = USV⊤ =
min{n,d}
∑
i=1
si(A)xiy
⊤
i .
Here,U ∈ Rn×n andV ∈ Rd×d are orthonormal matrices, S is a diagonalmatrix with diagonal entries singu-
lar values of A, and the sets {xi ∈ Rn : i ∈ min{n, d}} and
{
yj ∈ Rd : j ∈ min{n, d}
}
are orthonormal sets
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of vectors. Associated with any real matrix A ∈ Rn×d is a matrix A† called the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse
(or, pseudoinverse) and is defined as
A† =
min{n,d}
∑
i=1
1
si(A)
xiy
⊤
i where A =
min{n,d}
∑
i=1
si(A)xiy
⊤
i .
We use the notation
[A]k :=
min{k,n,d}
∑
i=1
si(A)xiy
⊤
i
to denote the best rank-k approximation of matrix A under any unitary invariant norm.
We consider matrices formed by a streams of d-dimensional row vectors over R. For a row vector
at ∈ Rd streamed at time t, we use the notation A¯(at) ∈ RW×d to denote an all zero matrix except row
t which is at if t ≤ W and row W to be at if t > W. For time epochs, t1 and t2, we define the matrix
A[t1,t2] ∈ R(t2−t1)×W to denote the matrix formed by stacking the row vectors at1 , · · · , at2 ∈ Rd streamed
from time epoch t1 to t2:
A[t1,t2] :=

at1
at1+1
...
at2

Probability distributions. For a random variable X ∈ R, we denote the mean and variance of X by E[X]
and Var(X), respectively. The symbols µ and σ2 are reserved to represent these quantities. We say that a
random variable X ∈ R has Gaussian (or normal) distribution if its probability density function is given by
p(x) =
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
.
We denote Gaussian distribution by N (µ, σ2) and write X ∼ N (µ, σ2) when X has Gaussian distribution.
Throughout this paper, we discuss andwork with randommatrices. They are simply matrices withmatrix
entries drawn from random variables that may or may not be independent. A special class of random
matrices are Wishart matrices. They are defined as below. Let C is a d × d positive definite matrix and
m > d − 1. A d × d random symmetric positive definite matrix R is said to have a Wishart distribution
R ∼ Wisd(m,C), if its probability density function is
p(W) :=
|R| m−d−12
2md|C| m2 Γd(m2 )
exp
(
1
2
Tr
(
C−1R
))
,
We also consider the constrained principal component analysis [CEM+15]. This is a generalization of many
variants of principal component analysis such as sparse and non-negative principal component analysis.
Definition 2 (Constrained principal component analysis [CEM+15]). Given a matrix AW formed by a window
of size W, a rank parameter k, a set of rank-k projection matrices Π and an accuracy parameter 0 < η < 1, design a
differentially private algorithm under sliding window model which outputs a projection matrix P ∈ Π such that
‖A− PA‖F ≤ (1+ η)min
X∈Π ‖A− XP‖F + τ
with probability at least 1− β. Furthermore, the algorithm should satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. When Π is a
set of all rank-k projection matrices, then we get the traditional problem of principal component analysis.
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3 Approximate spectral histogram
In this section, we introduce the central contribution of this paper: η-approximate spectral histogram property.
We later show in Section 4 that these properties are sufficient to perform all the matrix analysis mentioned
in Section 1 efficiently with respect to time, efficiency, and accuracy. In particular, by maintaining this
property, we canmaintain an intrinsic rank dependent bound. To maintain this property, our data structure
stores a set of random matrices that approximates the spectrum of the original matrices.
Let A˜ denotes the η-spectral approximation of the matrix A. Then η-approximate spectral histogram
property is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3 (η-approximate-spectral histogram property). A data structureD satisfy η-approximate spectral
histogram property if there exists an s = poly(n, logW) such thatD satisfy the following conditions
1. D consists of ℓ timestamps I := {t1, · · · , tℓ} and the corresponding matrices S := {S˜1, · · · , S˜ℓ}.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ s− 1, at least one of the following holds:
• If ti+1 = ti + 1, then
(
1− η2
)
S˜i 6 S˜i+1.
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 2:
(a) (1− η)Si  Si+1.
(b)
(
1− η2
)
S˜i 6 S˜i+2, where S˜i is η4 -spectral approximation of Si and S˜i+2 is η4 -spectral approxi-
mation of Si+2.
3. Let AW be the matrix formed by the windowW. Then S2  A⊤WAW  S1.
The difference between spectral histogram property [BDM+20] and η-approximate spectral histogram
property is that in η-approximate spectral histogram property, we allow the matrices in the data structure
to be a spectral approximation of the corresponding original matrices and in properties defined in item 2.
This relatively simple relaxation is crucial in achieving optimal results for our downstream matrix analysis
while preserving differential privacy.
We next show that we can maintain a data structure that allows efficient updates and a sequence of
matrices that satisfy the η-approximate spectral histogram property using an algorithm UPDATE-APPROX.
The case of continual observation [DNPR10] is covered in more detail in the appendix. We will later see
(in equation (6)) that the input to the UPDATE-APPROX is constructed in a specific manner; therefore, the
matrices in the sequence have a particular form and satisfy the Loewner ordering.
Lemma 1. Let D be a data structure that at time T consists of ℓ tuples {(ti, Si)}ℓi=1, where 0 < ti ≤ T for all i and
S⊤
ℓ
Sℓ  . . .  S⊤1 S⊤1 .
Let Dspectral ←UPDATE-APPROX(D) be the output of the algorithm UPDATE-APPROX, defined in Algorithm 1.
Then if Dspectral := {(t¯i, B1), . . . , (t¯m, Bm)} for some m ≤ ℓ+ 1, then {(t¯1, B⊤1 B1), . . . , (t¯m, B⊤mBm)} satisfy the
η-approximate spectral histogram property. Moreover, the algorithmDspectral runs in poly(d, ℓ) time.
Proof. The run-time ofDspectral is straightforward, so we only concentrate on the correctness part. Consider
a time epoch t and a succeeding time epoch t′ = t+ 1. First notice that if we cannot find a j in equation (3) for
all i = 1, · · · , ℓ− 2, then ℓ = O
(
d logW
η
)
. This is because the data structure DSpriv satisfied η-approximate
spectral histogram property at time t and if no such j exists, then none of the properties are violated due to
an update. As a result, equation (15) gives us that ℓ = O
(
d logW
η
)
. Hence, we assume that this is not the
case and the data structure got updated between time epochs t and t+ 1.
Let the data structure at time t be DSpriv(t) and at time t′ be DSpriv(t′). That is,
DSpriv(t) :=
{
(t1, A˜[t1,t]); · · · , (tℓ, A˜[tℓ,t])
}
DSpriv(t
′) :=
{
(t′1, B˜[t′1,t+1]); · · · , (t
′
ℓ
, B˜[t′
ℓ
,t+1])
}
.
Let ti be a timestamp in DSpriv(T) where i < ℓ. We can have two possibilities:
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Algorithm 1 UPDATE-APPROX(DSpriv)
Input: A data structure DSpriv storing a set of matrices A˜[t1,t], · · · , A˜[tℓ,t] such that
A˜⊤[ti,t]A˜[ti,t]  A˜
⊤
[ti+1,t]
A˜[ti+1,t] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1
and corresponding time stamps t1, · · · , tℓ.
Output: Updated matrices A˜[t1,t], · · · , A˜[tℓ,t] and timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ.
1: Define for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ,
K˜(i) := A˜⊤[ti,t]A˜[ti,t].
2: For i = 1, · · · ℓ− 2
3: Find ⊲ Find spectrally close checkpoints.
j := max
{
p :
(
1− η
2
)
K˜(i)  K˜(p) ∧ (i < p ≤ ℓ− 1)
}
(3)
4: Delete A˜[ti+1,t], · · · , A˜[tj−1,t].
5: Set k=1
6: While i+ k ≤ ℓ
7: Update the checkpoints: A˜[ti+k,t] = A˜[tj+k−1,t], ti+k = tj+k−1.
8: end
9: s := s+ i− j+ 1.
10: Define DSpriv :=
{
(A˜[t1,t], t1), · · · , (A˜[tℓ,t], tℓ)
}
.
11: Output DSpriv.
1. There is no c ∈ [s] such that t′c = ti and t′c+1 = ti+1.
2. There is a c ∈ [s] such that t′c = ti and t′c+1 = ti+1.
This is wherewe deviate fromBraverman et al. [BDM+20] in two respects: first, we need to deal with the
approximation factor and perturbation due to privacy, second, we simplify the second case which requires
two subcases in the proof of Braverman et al. [BDM+20]. Fix the following notations for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ:
K˜(j) := A˜⊤[tj,t]A˜[tj,t] and L˜(j) := B˜
⊤
[tj,t+1]
B˜[tj,t+1].
Let K(j) and L(j) be such that
(
1− η
4
)
K(j)  K˜(j) 
(
1+
η
4
)
K(j) and
(
1− η
4
)
L(j)  L˜(j) 
(
1+
η
4
)
L(j). (4)
As we will see later (in equation (6)), the input to the UPDATE-APPROX are constructed in a specific
manner that will ensure that K(j) and L(j) satisfy the Loewner ordering. Let us consider the first possibility,
i.e., there is no j ∈ [s] such that t′j = ti and t′j+1 = ti+1. By the update rule, we have(
1− η
2
)
L˜(j)  L˜(j+ 1).
Using Proposition 10, we have
(1− η)L(j) ≺
(
1− η
2
)(1− η4
1+ η4
)
L(j).
Equation (4) gives us a relationship between L(j) and L˜(j):
(
1− η
2
)(1− η4
1+ η4
)
L(j) 
(
1− η2
1+ η4
)
L˜(j).
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From the update rule, it follows that (
1− η2
1+ η4
)
L˜(j)  1
1+ η4
L˜(j+ 1)
Finally, another application of Equation (4) gives us
1
1+ η4
L˜(j+ 1)  L(j+ 1).
Therefore, we have the relation listed in item 2a in Definition 3. Furthermore, due to the maximality condi-
tion in the update rule, there exists an k ∈ [d] such that
sk(L˜(j+ 2)) <
(
1− η
2
)
sk(L˜(j)),
where {s1(D), · · · , sd(D)} denotes the singular values of an d× d matrix D. This proves the statement of
the Lemma 1 for the first scenario.
Now let us consider the second possibility. Again by the update rule, we have(
1− η
2
)
L˜(j)  L˜(j+ 1).
It follows from Proposition 10 and Theorem 9 that
(1− η)L(j) ≺
(
1− η
2
)(1− η4
1+ η4
)
L(j) 
(
1− η2
1+ η4
)
L˜(j).
Another application of the update rule and Theorem 9 gives us(
1− η2
1+ η4
)
L˜(j)  1
1+ η4
L˜(j+ 1)  L(j+ 1),
where the last positive semidefinite inequality follows from Theorem 9. The second part of η-approximate
spectral histogram property follows similarly as in the case of the first case. This proves the statement of the
Lemma 1 for the second sdenario.
Lemma 1 gives the guarantee that, if we are given a set of positive semidefinite matrices in the Loewner
ordering, thenwe can efficientlymaintain a small set of positive semidefinite matrices that satisfy η-approximate
spectral histogram property. The idea of our algorithm for spectral approximation is to ensure that UPDATE-
APPROX always receives a set of positive semidefinite matrices. This is attained by our algorithm PRIV-
INITIALIZE-APPROX, which gets as input a new row and updates all the matrices in the current data struc-
ture. We use both these subroutines in our main algorithm, SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX, that receives a stream
of rows and call these two subroutines on every new update. Equipped with Lemma 1, we show that
SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX, described in Algorithm 2 provides the following guarantee.
Theorem 3 (Private spectral approximation under sliding window). Given the privacy parameter ǫ, δ, window
size W, desired rank r approximation parameter η, and S = (at)t>0 be the stream such that at ∈ Rd. Let AW be the
matrix formed at time T using the last W updates as defined in equation (1). Then we have the following:
1. SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) is (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
2. A˜←SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) satisfies the following with probability 9/10:
(
1− η
4
)(
A⊤WAW +
cr log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
)
 A˜⊤ A˜  (1+
η
4 )
2
(1− η) A
⊤
WAW +
cr log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d.
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Algorithm 2 SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W)
Input: A stream, Ω, of row vectors {at} and the desired rank of matrices, r, privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), and
window sizeW.
Output: Amatrix A˜ ∈ R 4rη ×d at the end of the stream.
1: Initialize DSpriv to be an empty set and Φ ∈ R
4r
η ×(d+1) such that every entry Φ[i, j] ∼ N (0, η4r ).
2: while stream S has not ended
3: Include row: DSpriv ← PRIV-INITIALIZE-APPROX (DSpriv; at; t; (ǫ, δ);W;Φ; r).
4: ⊲ Algorithm 3
5: Update the data structure DSpriv ←UPDATE-APPROX(DSpriv). ⊲ Algorithm 1
6: end
7: Let DSpriv =
{
(ti, A˜[ti,t])
}ℓ
i=1
for some ℓ.
8: Output A˜ = A˜[t1,t].
3. The space required by SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) is O( dr
2
η2
logW).
4. The update time of SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX is poly(d, logW).
Proof. The proof of update time is pretty straightforward.We divide the proof of Theorem 3 in three parts:
(i) proof of accuracy guarantee (Lemma 2); (ii) the privacy proof (Lemma 3); and (iii) proof of the space
complexity (Lemma 4).
Lemma 2 (Accuracy guarantee). Let S := {at}Tt=1 be the streams of row and AW be the rank r matrix formed
in the time epoch [T −W + 1,W] as defined in equation (1). Then A˜ ← SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W)
satisfies the following
(
1− η
4
)(
A⊤WAW +
cr log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
)
 A˜⊤ A˜  (1+
η
4 )
(1− η) A
⊤
WAW +
cr log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
for a constant c > 0 with probability at least 1− β, where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of
PRIV-INITIALIZE-APPROX.
Proof. Note that the output of SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX (Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) is A˜[t1,t], the first matrix in the data
structure DSpriv. Let us write
Â[tj,t] :=
(
σ1d
A[tj,t]
)
.
Fix the following notations:
K(j) := A⊤[tj,t]A[tj,t]
K̂(j) :=
(
σ1d
A[tj,t]
)⊤ (
σ1d
A[tj,t]
)
= A⊤[tj,t]A[tj,t] + σ
2
1d = K(j) + σ
2
1d,
K˜(j) := A˜⊤[tj,t]A˜[tj,t] for all j ∈ [ℓ].
(6)
where
σ :=
16
√
r log(4/δ) + log(4/δ)
ǫ
.
Since the starting time of the window is sandwiched between the first and second timestamps, the
matrix A⊤WAW is approximated in the following manner:
K(2)  A⊤WAW  K(1) (7)
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Algorithm 3 PRIV-INITIALIZE-APPROX(DSpriv; at; t; (ǫ, δ);W;Φ; r)
Input: A new row at ∈ Rd, a data structure DSpriv storing a set of timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ and set of matrices
A˜[t1,t], · · · , A˜[tℓ,t],
current time t, window sizeW, and random matrix Φ ∈ R 4rη ×d.
Output: Updated matrices A˜[t1,t], · · · , A˜[tℓ,t] and timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ.
1: if t2 < t−W + 1
2: Set tj = tj+1, A˜[tj,t] := A˜[tj+1,t] for 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1 ⊲ Delete the expired timestamp.
3: end
4: Sample a gaussian row vector g ∈ R 4rη .
5: Set tℓ+1 = t, σ =
16
√
r log(4/δ)+log(4/δ)
ǫ , and
A˜[tℓ+1,t] :=
(
Φ g⊤
) (σ1d
at
)
∈ R 4rη ×d, A˜ := g⊤at ∈ R
4r
η ×d. (5)
6: Update DSpriv ← DSpriv ∪ (A˜[tℓ+1,t], t).
7: for i = 2, . . . , ℓ
8: Compute A˜[ti,t] ← A˜[ti,t] + A˜. ⊲ Update the matrices.
9: end
10: Return DSpriv :=
{
(A˜[ti,t], ti)
}ℓ
i=1
.
Moreover, from the η-approximate spectral histogram property, we have the following relation between
K̂(1) and K̂(2) (equivalently Â[t1,t] and Â[t2,t]):
(1− η)K̂(1)  K̂(2). (8)
Since K˜(j) is η4 -spectral approximation of K̂(j) for all j ∈ [ℓ], setting ζ = η4 and A := Â[ti,t] for i = {1, 2} in
Theorem 9, we have with probability 1− β,(
1− η
4
)
K̂(1)  K˜(1) 
(
1+
η
4
)
K̂(1).(
1− η
4
)
K̂(2)  K˜(2) 
(
1+
η
4
)
K̂(2).
(9)
Using equation (6) and (9), we have that(
1− η
4
)
(K(1) + σ21d)  K˜(1). (10)
Since adding positive semidefinite matrices preserves the Loewner ordering, using equation (7) we can
dedure the following implication from equation (10), we get the following:(
1− η
4
)
(A⊤WAW + σ
2
1d) 
(
1− η
4
)
(K(1) + σ21d)  K˜(1). (11)
This completes the proof of the lower bound on K˜(1). To upper bound K˜(1), equation (9) gives us
K˜(1) 
(
1+
η
4
)
K̂(1). (12)
Combined with equation (8), equation (12) gives us
K˜(1) 
(
1+ η4
)
(1− η) K̂(2). (13)
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Combining equation (13) with equation (6) and equation (7) then gives us
K˜(1) 
(
1+ η4
)
(1− η)
(
A⊤WAW + σ21d
)
. (14)
This completes the proof of the upper bound on K˜(1). The statement of the lemma follows by combining
equations (11) and (14) and substituting the value of σ.
Lemma 3 (Privacy guarantee). Let S := {at}Tt=1 be the streams of row and AW be the rank r matrix formed in
the time epoch [T −W + 1,W] as defined in equation (1). Then A˜ ← SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Let P denote the output distribution of our mechanism when run on the input matrix A[ti,t] and
similarly let Q denote the output of our algorithm on input matrix A′[ti,t]. Both distribution are supported
on S := Rd×d matrices. For M ∈ S, consider the privacy loss function
L(M) := log
(P(M)
Q(M)
)
.
Our goal is to show that
PrM[L(M) ≤ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ.
for all T. We accomplish this by considering following three different cases
1. When T < t: In this case, the output distributions of P and Q are identical. It follows that L(M) = 0.
2. When T = t: In this case, we note that all singular values of matrix is at least σ. Therefore, the privacy
proof follows from Theorem 12, which in particular implies that
PrM[L(M) ≤ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ.
3. When T > t: This final case follows by invoking the post processing property of differential privacy
mechanisms (Lemma 9).
This completes the proof of privacy guarantee.
Lemma 4 (Space complexity). Let η ∈ (0, 1/4) be the approximation parameter, (ǫ, δ) be the privacy parameters,
and W be the size of the window. The total space required to maintain the data structure DSpriv, and hence the
algorithm SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W), is O
(
r2d
η log n logW
)
.
Proof. The number of checkpoints stored by DSpriv is O
(
r
η logW
)
. This follows from basic counting argu-
ment. There are at most r singular values. Since each checkpoints are at least (1− η2 ) apart for at least one
singular value and all the non-zero singular values are bounded by a polynomial, there can be at most
c log(1− η2 )(W) = c
logW
log(1− η2 )
≤ 2c
η
logW (15)
checkpoints that sees the jump in a specific singular value. Since each checkpoint defined by ti (for i ≥
2) stores a covariance matrix, using Theorem 9, the total space used by the checkpoints
{
A˜[ti,t], ti
}
i≥2 is
O
(
rd
η logW
)
. This finishes the proof of Lemma 4.
Theorem 3 follows by combining Lemma 3, Lemma 2, and Lemma 4.
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Since
(1+ η4 )
(1− η) ≤ 1+ 2η
for η ≤ 38 , a direct corollary of Theorem 3 is the following:
Corollary 1. Let η ∈ (0, 38 ). Then SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) outputs a matrix A˜ such that
(1− η)
(
A⊤WAW −
cr log(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
)
 A˜⊤ A˜  (1+ η)
(
A⊤WAW +
cr log(1/δ)
ǫ
1d
)
for some constant c > 0.
If we wish to output a positive semidefinite matrix, one can achieve a better accuracy guarantee than
what Theorem 3 gives. The idea is to compute A˜⊤ A˜− σ21d. This is encapsulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given the privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), window size W, desired rank r, and approximation parameter β,
let S = {at}t>0 be the streams such that at ∈ Rd. Let AW be the matrix formed at time T using the last W updates
as defined in equation (1). Let A˜ ← SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W). Then we can compute a positive
semidefinite matrix C such that
Pr
[
(1− η) A⊤WAW −
cηr log(1/δ)
4ǫ2
1d  C  (1+ η) A⊤WAW +
cηr log(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d.
]
≥ 1− β.
Moreover, computing C preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Compute A˜ ← SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX(Ω; r; (ǫ, δ);W) and let C = A˜⊤ A˜− σ21d. Then using Corol-
lary 1, we have for the lower bound:
C = A˜⊤ A˜− cr log(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d  (1− η)
(
A⊤WAW −
cr log(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
)
− cr log(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
= (1− η)A⊤WAW −
cηr log(1/δ)
ǫ2
1d
as required. The upper bound follows similarly.
4 Applications
Algorithm 2 can be used in solving many matrix analysis problems with better additive error. As a warm
up, we consider directional variance queries. Theorem 15 is true for any d-dimensional unit vector x ∈ Rd.
However, in many practical scenarios, it is infeasible to ask all possible questions, but only a bounded
number of queries. If we are given an apriori bound q on the number of queries an analyst can make in the
entire history, we can apply SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX to get dimension independent bound.
Theorem 5 (Directional variance queries). Given privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) and approximation parameter η ∈
(0, 1/2), let AW be the matrix formed by last W updates as defined in equation (1). Given a bound q, on the number
of queries that can be made, there is an efficient (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm that outputs a matrix C such
that for any set of q unit vector queries x1, · · · , xq ∈ Rd, we have for all i ∈ [q]
〈xiAw, Awxi〉 − c log q log d
ǫ
≤ 〈xi,Cxi〉 ≤ 1(1− η) 〈xiAw, Awxi〉+
c log q log d
ǫ
.
Proof. We use r = O(log q) in Algorithm 2 to get a matrix A˜. Then we output C = A˜⊤ A˜. Corollary 1 then
gives us the result.
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For the rest of this section, we will explore applications of Algorithm 2 in principal component analysis
in both constrained and unconstrained form. Recall that Theorem 16 gives an accuracy bound on PCA that
depends linearly on the dimension of the data. However, one would ideally like the dependencies to be
sublinear in d. In this section, we give a method to achieve this.
For this, we introduce a new concept which we call private projection preserving summary. This can be seen
as the private analogue of projection cost preserving sketches [CEM+15]. However, it is far from clear if the
techniques used in non-private literature extends straightforwardly. We show that Algorithm 2with proper
choice of parameters provides us with one such summary. This can be later employed to solve constrained
and unconstrained principal component analysis.
4.1 Private Projection Preserving Sketch
In this section, we introduce a notion called private projection preserving summary. This notion would be
useful in giving our bounds on the principal component analysis and in giving the first bound on private
constrained principal component analysis.
Definition 4 (Private Projection Preserving Summary). Let k be a desired rank. Given a set of rank-k projection
matrices Π, a matrix A˜ ∈ Rn×d is called a private projection preserving summary of A ∈ Rn×d with error 0 ≤ η < 1
if it is (ǫ, δ) differentially private and for all P ∈ Π,
(1− η) ‖A− PA‖2F − τ1 ≤
∥∥∥A˜− PA˜∥∥∥2
F
≤ (1− η) ‖A− PA‖2F + τ2
for τ1, τ2 that depends on k, d, ǫ, δ.
Private projection preserving summary can be seen as the private analogue of projection-cost preserving
sketches introduced by Cohen, Elder, Musco, Musco, and Persu [CEM+15]; however, there are some key
differences. First of all, we do not require a constant c that depends only on A and A˜. Second of all, there is
a difference in quantifier. We do not require the private projection preserving summary to be with respect to
all rank-k projection matrices but a predefined set Π of projection matrices. This flexibility is important as
we can design the projection cost preserving summary that depends on the projection matrices. However,
our result is independent of the set of projection matrices. In particular, we show the following:
Lemma 5. Let k be the desired rank, η be the approximation parameter, and (ǫ, δ) be the privacy parameter. Let Π
be the set of all rank-k projection matrices. Then for a given matrix AW formed by the last W updates as defined
in equation (1), the output A˜ ←SLIDING-PRIV-PCP
(
Ω; k+log(1/β)η ; (ǫ, δ);W
)
is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private and
satisfies the following for all P ∈ Π with probability at least 1− β,
(1− 6η)
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
− c1K ≤ ‖A(1d − P)‖F ≤ (1+ 6η)
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
+ c2K,
where
K :=
√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
for k′ := k+ log(1/β).
Proof. Let
Â =
(
σ1d
A
)
where σ =
16
√
r log(4/δ) + log(4/δ)
ǫ
is as defined in Algorithm 1. By subadditivity of Frobenius norm, we have
‖A(1d − P)‖F −
√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
≤
∥∥∥Â(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
≤ ‖A(1d − P)‖F +
√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
. (16)
We wish to use Lemma 7. For this, we design E1, E2, E3 and E4 that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 7.
Let Â = V̂ŜÛ⊤ be a singular value decomposition. Let Ûk be the top k-left singular vectors of Â and let
P1 = ÛkÛ
⊤
k be a rank-k orthonormal projection matrix. Then we define
E1 := P⊤1 Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP1 − P⊤1 Â⊤ ÂP1.
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From the subspace embedding property of Φ [CW17], we have that
−η1 Â⊤ Â  E1  η1 Â⊤ Â.
Let P2 := (1d − P1) and define
E2 := P⊤2 Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP2 − P⊤2 Â⊤ ÂP2.
By construction E2 is symmetric. Moreover, using [KN14, Theorem 21] gives us
Tr (E2) = Tr
(
P⊤2 Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP2 − P⊤2 Â⊤ ÂP2
)
= Tr
(
P⊤2 Â⊤(Φ⊤Φ− 1d)ÂP2
)
≤
∥∥∥ÂP2∥∥∥
F
∥∥∥Φ⊤Φ− 1d∥∥∥
2
∥∥∥ÂP2∥∥∥
F
=
∥∥∥Â− ÂP1∥∥∥
F
∥∥∥Φ⊤Φ− 1d∥∥∥
2
∥∥∥Â− ÂP1∥∥∥
F
=
∥∥∥Â− [Â]k∥∥∥2
F
∥∥∥Φ⊤Φ− 1d∥∥∥
2
≤ η
k
∥∥∥Â− [Â]k∥∥∥2
F
because P2 is the orthogonal projection to the top-k singular space of Â. Using the inequality relationship
between trace norm and Frobenius norm, it follows that
k
∑
i=1
|λi(E2)| ≤
√
k ‖E2‖F .
Now we define the matrices E3 and E4 using the cross terms as below.
E3 := P⊤1 Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP2 − P⊤1 Â⊤ ÂP2 and E4 := P⊤2 Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP1 − P⊤2 Â⊤ ÂP1.
We show the desired bound for the case of E3. The case for E4 follows similarly. First of all, by definition of
P1 and the fact that P1 and P2 are orthogonal to each other, we simply have
E3 = P
⊤
1 Â
⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP2 − P⊤1 Â⊤ ÂP2 = P⊤1 Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂP2 (17)
Using [KN14, Theorem 21], if follows from the singular value decomposition of Â and
∥∥∥Ûk∥∥∥
F
=
√
k,
that
Tr
(
E⊤3 (Â⊤Â)†E3
)
=
∥∥∥ÛkΦ⊤ΦÂ(1− P1)∥∥∥2
F
≤ η2
∥∥∥Â− [Â]k∥∥∥2
F
(18)
as required. Using Lemma 7, we have
(1− 5η)
∥∥∥ΦÂ(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
≤
∥∥∥Â(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
+ η
∥∥∥Â− [Â]k∥∥∥
F
≤ (1+ 5η)
∥∥∥ΦÂ(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
.
Rearranging the term and using Equation (16) completes the proof of Lemma 5.
4.2 Private Principal Component Analysis
In Section C.1, we gave an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm under sliding window model to compute
the principal component of the matrix formed in the sliding window. However, the additive error there
depends linearly on the dimension. In this section, we show that we can improve the accuracy guarantee
significantly. Let Π be the set of all rank-k orthonormal projection matrices. We use the following algorithm
for this purpose:
As before, we can solve the rank-constrained problem using the result of [Upa18] (see Section B).
Theorem 6. Given privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) and approximation parameter η ∈ (0, 1/2), let AW be the matrix
formed by the last W updates as defined in equation (1) and Π be the set of all rank-k orthonormal projection matri-
ces. Then SLIDING-PRIV-PCA, described in Algorithm 4, is an efficient (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm that
outputs a rank-k orthonormal projection matrix X˜ ∈ Rd×d such that with probablity 1− β,∥∥∥AW − AW X˜∥∥∥
F
≤
(
1+ 6η
1− 6η
)
min
P∈Π ‖AW(1d − P)‖F +O
(
log(1/δ)
ǫ
√
(d log d)(k+ log(1/β))
)
.
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Algorithm 4 SLIDING-PRIV-PCA(Ω, k; (ǫ, δ);W)
Input: A stream, Ω, of row vectors {at} and the desired rank of matrices, r, privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), and
window sizeW.
Output: A real-valued matrix A˜ at the end of the stream.
1: Compute ⊲ Algorithm 2
A˜← SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX
(
Ω;
k+ log(1/β)
η
; (ǫ, δ);W
)
.
2: Output
X˜ := argmin
P,rank(P)≤k
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
.
Proof. Let k′ = k+ log(1/β). Define
X̂ := argmin
X∈Π
‖AW(1d − P)‖F and X˜ := argmin
X∈Π
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
.
Using the left hand inequality in Lemma 5, we have∥∥∥A˜(1d − X˜)∥∥∥
F
≤
∥∥∥A˜(1d − X̂)∥∥∥
F
≤ 1
(1− 6η)
(∥∥∥AW(1d − X̂)∥∥∥
F
+
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
. (19)
Similarly, using the right hand inequality in Lemma 5, we have∥∥∥A˜(1d − X˜)∥∥∥
F
≥ 1
(1+ 6η)
(∥∥∥AW(1d − X˜)∥∥∥
F
− k
′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
. (20)
Combining Equations (19) and (20), we have the result.
4.3 Private Constrained Principal Component Analysis
In this section, we prove our result on private constrained principal component analysis. The traditional no-
tion of principal component analysis minimizes over all possible set of rank-k projectionmatrices. However,
recently researchers in machine learning has found applications where the rank-k projection matrices also
satisfy other structural properties, like sparsity and non-negativity [APD14, dGJL05, PDK13, YZ13, ZS07].
There are also non-private algorithms for such problems as well. On the other hand, there is no prior work
in privacy preserving literature for structural principal component analysis.
Algorithm 5 SLIDING-PRIV-CONSTRAINED-PCA(Ω, k; (ǫ, δ);W;Π)
Input: A stream, Ω, of row vectors {at} and the desired rank of matrices, r, privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), a set
of rank-k projection matrices, Π, and window sizeW.
Output: A real-valued matrix A˜ at the end of the stream.
1: Compute ⊲ Algorithm 2
A˜← SLIDING-PRIV-APPROX
(
Ω;
k+ log(1/β)
η
; (ǫ, δ);W
)
.
2: Output
X˜ := argmin
P∈Π
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
.
using any known non-private algorithm.
We show the following for constrained principal component analysis:
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Theorem 7. Given privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) and approximation parameter η ∈ (0, 1/2), let AW be the matrix
formed by the last W updates as defined in equation (1) and Π be a given set of rank-k orthonormal projection matrices.
Algorithm SLIDING-PRIV-CONSTRAINED-PCP, described in Algorithm 5, outputs A˜ satisfying (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy. Let P ∈ Π be a projection matrix satisfying∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
≤ γ ·min
X∈Π
∥∥∥A˜(1d − X)∥∥∥
F
. (21)
Then with probablity 1− β,
‖AW(1d − P)‖ ≤
(
1+ η
1− η
)
γ ·min
X∈Π ‖AW(1d − X)‖+O
(√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
.
Proof. Define
P̂ = argmin
P∈Π
‖AW(1d − P)‖F , P˜ = argmin
P∈Π
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
.
Since P˜ is a minimizer, it implies the following∥∥∥A˜(1d − P˜)∥∥∥
F
≤
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P̂)∥∥∥
F
(22)
as P̂ ∈ Π. Combining with the equation (21), we have∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
≤ γ
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P˜)∥∥∥
F
. (23)
for P ∈ Π as defined in equation (21).
Using the right hand side inequality of Lemma 5, we have
(1+ η)
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P)∥∥∥
F
+
√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
≥ ‖AW(1d − P)‖F (24)
Combining Equation (23) and (24), we have
‖AW(1d − P)‖F ≤ (1+ η)γ
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P˜)∥∥∥
F
+
√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ
. (25)
Using the left hand side inequality of Lemma 5, we have
∥∥∥A˜(1d − P̂)∥∥∥
F
≤
(
1
1− η
)∥∥∥AW(1d − P̂)∥∥∥
F
+
√
k′d log(1/δ)
ǫ(1− η) . (26)
Combining Equations (26) and (24), we have the result.
4.4 Generalized Overconstrained Linear Regression
The question of generalized linear regression problem is as follows: given two matrices A ∈ Rn×d and
B ∈ Rn×p as input, generalized linear regression is defined as the following minimization problem:
argmin
X∈Rd×p
‖AX− B‖2F .
This problem is also known as multiple-response regression, and is used mostly in the analysis of low-rank
approximation (see [CW17] and references therein). We show the following:
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Theorem 8 (Linear regression). Given privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) and approximation parameter η ∈ (0, 1/2), let
AW ∈ RW×d and B ∈ RW×p be the matrix streamed during the window of size W formed as defined in equation (1).
Let
X̂ := argmin
X∈Rd×p
‖AWX− BW‖2F .
Then we can efficiently output a matrix X˜ ∈ Rd×p while preserving (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy such that∥∥∥AW X˜− BW∥∥∥2
F
≤
(
1
1− η
)
min
X∈Rd×p
‖AWX − B‖2F +
c(τ + p)2 log(τ+ p)
ǫ
for some large constant c > 0 and τ = d+ 14
ǫ2
log(4/δ).
Proof. To reduce the notation overhead, we use A = AW and B = BW to denote the matrices streamed
in the last W updates. We use
(
A B
) ∈ RW×(d+p) as the matrix that is being streamed and assume
C⊤C ∈ R(d+p)×(d+p) as an output. We solve the following unconstrained minimization problem:
minimize: Tr
((
X⊤ −1⊤p
)
C⊤C
(
X
−1p
))
where X ∈ Rd×p. Let X˜ be an optimal solution to the above minimization problem. In particular, this
implies that for all X ∈ Rd×p,
Tr
((
X˜⊤ −1p
)
C⊤C
(
X˜
−1p
))
≤ Tr
((
X⊤ −1p
)
C⊤C
(
X
−1p
))
.
Let
X̂ := argmin
X∈Rd×p
‖AWX− BW‖2F
be an optimal solution for the original regression problem. If follows that for all X ∈ Rd×p,∥∥∥AW X̂− BW∥∥∥2
F
≤ ‖AWX− BW‖2F . (27)
The right side of Equation (41) gives us∥∥∥∥C( X˜−1p
)∥∥∥∥2
F
≤
∥∥∥∥C( X̂−1p
)∥∥∥∥2
F
≤ 1
(1− η)
∥∥∥∥(AW BW) ( X̂−1p
)∥∥∥∥2
F
+
c(τ + p)2 log(τ + p)
ǫ
=
1
1− η
∥∥∥AW X̂− BW∥∥∥2
F
+
c(τ+ p)2 log(τ + p)
ǫ
=
1
1− η minX∈Rd×p ‖AWX− BW‖
2
F +
c(τ+ p)2 log(τ + p)
ǫ
, (28)
where the second equality is by the definition of X̂. Similarly, the left hand side inequality of Equation (41)
gives us a lower bound as follows:∥∥∥∥C( X˜−1p
)∥∥∥∥2
F
≥
∥∥∥∥(AW BW) ( X˜−1p
)∥∥∥∥2
F
− c(τ + p)
2 log(τ + p)
ǫ
=
∥∥∥AW X˜− BW∥∥∥2
F
− c(τ+ p)
2 log(τ+ p)
ǫ
. (29)
Combining Equation (28) and (29) gives us the claimed result.
20
5 The big picture and open questions
We believe that our approach will find applications beyond what is covered in this paper. It also paves
way for more research in the intersection of differential privacy and sliding window model. Motivated
by heuristics used in recent deployments, the focus of this paper is on the model where every data in the
current window is considered equally useful. However, one can alternatively consider other variants of the
sliding window model as far as privacy is concerned. For example, one can consider a model where the
privacy of a data decays as a monotonic function as time lapse. More so, there are more concrete questions
to be asked and answered even in the model studied in this paper. We mention few of them next.
As we mentioned earlier, one can see η-approximate spectral histogram property as a generalization
of subspace embedding property. We also designed a data structure that allows us to maintain a small
set of positive semidefinite matrices that satisfy η-approximate spectral histogram property on every new
update. We believe any improvement in designing a more efficient data structure for maintaining a set
of matrices satisfying η-approximate spectral histogram property would have a profound impact on large-
scale deployment of privacy-preserving algorithms in the sliding window model. For example, we believe
we can reduce space requirements using randomization. This randomization can be either oblivious or may
depend on the current set of positive semidefinite matrices. Since our set of positive semidefinite matrices
are generated using a privacy mechanism, any such sampling can be seen as post-processing. Our main
conjectures thus are concerning the space required by any privacy-preserving algorithm. We elaborate them
next.
The lower bound of Ω(d2) space for spectral approximation is required even in the static setting. We
conjecture that there should be 1η logW factor due to the sliding window requirement. This is because, if the
spectrum of a matrix is polynomially bounded, then one can construct a sequence of update that requires
at least 1η logW matrices such that successive matrices are (1− η) apart in terms of their spectrum. For an
upper bound, we believe randomization can help reduce a factor of d. This is achieved in the non-private
setting using online row sampling. It was shown by [Upa18] that one can design private algorithms with
space-bound comparable to a non-private algorithm in the streaming model of computation. The situation
in the sliding window model is more complicated, but we believe more sophisticated techniques can be
used to achieve the matching upper bound. That is, we conjecture the following:
Conjecture 1. The space required for differentially private spectral approximation is Θ
(
d2
η logW
)
.
We believe that the bound on the additive error is optimal. So, a positive resolution to this conjecture
would imply that the price of privacy is only in terms of the additive error.
Our second conjecture is for principal component analysis. We believe that our space-bound for princi-
pal component analysis is tight up to a factor of kη . A lower bound of Ω(dk) is trivial as one requiresO(dk)
space just to store the orthonormal matrix corresponding to the rank-k projection matrix. As before, a factor
of 1η logW would be incurred due to the sliding window model. The factor of
1
η comes from the fact that to
extract the top-k subspace, we need kη dimensional subspace. We summarize it in the following conjecture:
Conjecture 2. The space required for differentially private principal component analysis is Ω
(
dk
η2
logW
)
.
We believe that proving such a lower bound would require new techniques. This is because, in principal
component analysis, we only have access to an orthonormal projection matrix, while in the case of low-rank
approximation, we have far more information to solve the underlying communication complexity problem.
Our work identifies another application of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss and Wishart mechanisms. Before
our results, it was not even clear whether the JL mechanism can be used to compute PCA (see Section V
in [BBDS12])! They consider their output matrix C˜ as a “test" matrix to test if the input matrix has high
directional variance along some direction x ∈ Rd. However, they do not give any guarantee as to how the
spectrum of C relates to that of the input covariance matrix.
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A Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, differential privacy in the sliding window setting has not been studied for
matrix-valued functions. However, the matrix problems considered in this paper have been studied from
a privacy perspective in static setting. We first review private matrix analysis in static setting followed by
matrix analysis in sliding window model.
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Spectral approximation. Blocki et al. [BBDS12] initiated the study of private approximate spectral anal-
ysis of matrices. For a matrix A, they first compute the singular value decomposition (SVD) USV⊤ and
then perturb the singular values to compute Â := U
√
S2 + σ21dV
⊤. Here σ is the perturbation parameter
chosen appropriately. Their final output is CBBDS = Â⊤Φ⊤ΦÂ, where Φ is a random Gaussian matrix.
This is in contrast with [DTTZ14] who compute CDTTZ = A⊤A + N, where N is a symmetric Gaussian
matrix with variance required to preserve differential privacy. It is easy to see that both CBBDS is positive
semidefinite and CDTTZ is a symmetric matrix. Moreover, for Φ with appropriate dimension, CBBDS is a
spectral approximation of A up to a small distortion in spectrum [Sar06]. However, it is not clear if they can
be extended to the streaming model or more restricted sliding window model because they first compute
and perturb the SVD of A4.
Principal component analysis and linear regression. There has been an extensive body of work on pri-
vate principal component analysis both Frobenius norm [BDMN05, DTTZ14, HR12, Upa18] and spectral
norm [DTTZ14, HP14, KT13]. Moreover, in static setting, matching lower and upper bounds are known on
achievable accuracy. Except for [Upa18], these results do not extend to dynamic setting and none of them
extend to the sliding window model. Finally, private linear regression has also been studied extensively in
static setting, and matching upper and lower bounds are known [DS10, KST12, CMS11].
Non-privare dynamic setting. In the non-private setting, Braverman, Drineas, Upadhyay, Woodruff, and
Zhou [BDM+20] noted that many matrix analysis problems do not comply with the existing framework of
the slidingwindowmodel. They gave an algorithm for spectral sparsification using online row sampling algo-
rithm [CMP16] and for computing low-rank approximation using projection cost preserving sketches [CEM+15].
They employed importance sampling as a subroutine, where each row is sampled with probability defined
by the current matrix and the new row. Since the sampling probability depends on the matrix itself, it is not
immediately clear how to perform such sampling privately – sampling probability can itself leak privacy.
Upadhyay [Upa19] recently showed that, in general, non-private algorithms do not directly extend to the
private setting in the sliding window model for even simple tasks such as estimating frequency moments.
Conceptually η-approximate spectral histogram property is a generalization of subspace embedding prop-
erty to the sliding window model when the subspace is the intrinsic dimension of the matrix. While sub-
space embedding is useful when entire historical data is used, it is not clear how to use it for differential
privacy in the slidingwindowmodel. The underlying reasons are as follows. Subspace embedding has been
used extensively in performing randomized numerical linear algebra [DM17, Woo14] when the entire his-
torical data is considered important. There are two broad techniques for subspace embedding: row-sampling
and random sketching. While row-sampling can be extended to the sliding window model [BDM+20], it is
not immediate if we can perform such sampling privately because sampling probability can itself lead
to a loss in privacy. On the other hand, while we can generate private sketches using random projec-
tion [BBDS12, MMNW11, Upa18], it is unclear how to remove from the current sketch the contribution of
rows before the lastW updates.
B Auxiliary lemma
The following is a well known result in randomized numerical linear algebra, first shown by Sarlos [Sar06]
and later improved by a series of works.
Theorem 9 (Clarkson-Woofruff [CW17]). Let A ∈ Rn×d be a rank r matrix and Φ ∈ Rn× 4rη be random matrix
with i.i.d. copies of N (0, η4r ). Then we have
Pr
[(
1− η
4
)
A⊤A  A⊤Φ⊤ΦA 
(
1+
η
4
)
A⊤A
]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
.
4Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] gave an online algorithm to private singular value computation using regularized follow-the-leader frame-
work; however, online setting is very different from the setting of sliding window model.
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Definition 5 (Subspace embedding). An embedding for a set of points P ⊆ Rn with distortion α is an r × n
matrix E such that
∀x ∈ P, (1− η) ‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Ex‖22 ≤ (1+ η) ‖x‖22 .
A subspace embedding is an embedding for a set K, where K is a k-dimensional linear subspace.
In this paper, we use random projections. For more details, see Clarkson and Woodruff [CW17].
Lemma 6 (Sarlos [Sar06] and Clarkson-Woodruff [CW17]). Let R ∈ Rt×n be a distribution of random Gaus-
sian matrix, i.e., for R ∼ R, such that R[i, j] ∼ N (0, 1/t). Then R satisfies subspace embedding for some
t = O(η−2 log(1/β)) and affine embedding for some t = O(rη−2 log(1/β)).
A key concept in randomized numerical linear algebra and low rank approximation is that of rank-k
projection cost preserving sketch. It was defined by [CEM+15].
Definition 6 (Rank-k projection-cost preserving sketch [CEM+15]). A matrix A˜ ∈ Rn×d is a rank k projection-
cost preserving sketch of A ∈ Rn×d with error 0 ≤ η < 1 if, for all rank k orthogonal projection matrices P ∈ Rn×n,
(1− η) ‖A− PA‖F ≤
∥∥∥A˜− PA˜∥∥∥
F
+ c ≤ (1+ η) ‖A− PA‖F
for some fixed non-negative constant c that may depend on A and A˜ but is independent of P.
Cohen et al. [CEM+15] showed many characterizations of rank-k projection cost preserving sketch. One
of their characterizations is relevant to our work which we present in the lemma below.
Lemma 7 (Sufficient condition for rank-k PCP [CEM+15]). A matrix A˜ is a rank-k projection-cost preserving
sketch with two sided error η and c = min {0, η′2 ‖A− [A]k‖F} as long as we can write
A˜⊤ A˜− A⊤A = E1 + E2 + E3 + E4,
where
1. E1 is symmetric and −η1A⊤A  E1  η1A⊤A.
2. E2 is symmetric, Tr (E2) ≤ η′2 ‖A− [A]k‖2F, and
k
∑
i=1
|λi(E2)| ≤ η2 ‖A− [A]k‖2F .
3. The span of columns of E3 is a subspace of span of columns of A
⊤A and
Tr
(
E⊤3 (A⊤A)†E3
)
≤ η23 ‖A− [A]k‖2F .
4. The span of rows of E4 is a subspace of span of rows of A
⊤A and
Tr
(
E⊤4 (A⊤A)†E4
)
≤ η23 ‖A− [A]k‖2F .
5. η = η1 + η2 + η
′
2 + η3 + η4.
Proposition 10. For η ∈ (0, 1), we have (1− η) < (1− η2 ) ( 1− η41+ η4
)
Proof. For η ∈ (0, 1), we have the following:
(1− η)
(
1+
η
4
)
= 1− 3η
4
− η
2
4
≤ 1− 3η
4
+
η2
8
=
(
1− η
2
) (
1− η
4
)
.
Since η2 > 0, the result follows.
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The following lemma was first proven in [Upa18]. We give a proof for the sake of completion.
Lemma 8. Let R be a matrix with orthonormal rows and C have orthonormal columns. Then for a given matrix F of
conforming dimensions, we have
min
X:rank(X)=k
‖CXR− F‖F = ‖C[C⊤FR⊤]kR− F‖F,
where rank(X) denotes the rank of matrix X.
Proof. For any matrix Y of appropriate dimension, we have〈
F− CC⊤F,CC⊤F− CYR
〉
= 0.
This is because F− CC⊤F = (1− CC⊤)F lies in space orthogonal to C(C⊤F − YR). By Pythagorean theo-
rem,
‖F− CYR‖2F = ‖F− CC⊤F‖2F + ‖CC⊤F− CYR‖2F = ‖F− CC⊤F‖2F + ‖C⊤F−YR‖2F, (30)
where the second equality follows from the properties of unitary matrices. Again, for any matrix Y of
appropriate dimensions, we have〈
C⊤FR⊤R− YR,C⊤F− C⊤FR⊤R
〉
= 0.
This follows becauseC⊤FR⊤R−YR = (C⊤FR⊤−Y)R lies in the space spanned by R, andC⊤F−C⊤FR⊤R =
C⊤F(1− R⊤R) lies in the orthogonal space. Applying Pythagorean theorem again, we have that
‖C⊤F−YR‖2F = ‖C⊤F− C⊤FR⊤R‖2F + ‖C⊤FR⊤R−YR‖2F (31)
Since ‖C⊤F− C⊤FR⊤R‖2F is independent of Y, we just bound the term ‖C⊤FR⊤R−YR‖2F. Substituting
Y = [CFR]k and using the fact that multiplying R from the right does not change the Frobenius norm and
[C⊤FR⊤]k is the best k-rank approximation to the matrix C⊤FR⊤, for all rank-k matrices Z, we have
‖C⊤FR⊤R− [C⊤FR⊤]kR‖2F ≤ ‖C⊤FR⊤R− ZR‖2F. (32)
Combining equation (32) with equation (31) and Pythagorean theorem, we have
‖C⊤F− [CFR]kR‖2F ≤ ‖C⊤F− C⊤FR⊤R‖2F + ‖C⊤FR⊤R− ZR‖2F = ‖C⊤F− ZR‖2F. (33)
Combining equation (33) with equation (30), the fact that C has orthonormal columns, and Pythagorean
theorem, we have
‖F− C[CFR]kR‖2F ≤ ‖F− CC⊤F‖2F + ‖C⊤F− ZR‖2F
= ‖F− CC⊤F‖2F + ‖CC⊤F− CZR‖2F = ‖F− CZR‖2F.
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
Differential privacy. An often easy to handle way to define (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is in the terms of
privacy loss function. Let S be the support of the output of an algorithm M. LetP be the output distribution
of Mwhen its input is AW(t) andQ be the output distribution of Mwhen its input is A′W(t). Then for v ∈ S,
we define the privacy loss function as follows:
L(v) := log
(P(v)
Q(v)
)
.
An algorithm M is (ǫ, δ) differentially private if
Prv∼P [L(v;M) ≤ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ.
One of the key features of differential privacy is that it is preserved under arbitrary post-processing,
i.e., an analyst, without additional information about the private database, cannot compute a function that
makes an output less differentially private. In other words,
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Lemma 9 (Dwork et al. [DMNS06]). Let M(D) be an (ǫ, δ)-differential private mechanism for a database D , and
let h be any function, then any mechanism M′ := h(M(D)) is also (ǫ, δ)-differentially private for the same set of
tasks.
Theorem 11 (Wishart mechanism [She19]). Draw a sample R ∼ Wisd(τ,1d), where τ ≥ d+ 28 ln(4/δ)ǫ2 . Then for
a matrix X ∈ Rn×d, X⊤X+ R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
We also make use of the following result regarding Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism first introduced
by Blocki et al. [BBDS12] and later improved by Sheffet [She19].
Theorem 12 (Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism [She19]). Fix a positive integer r and let w be such that w =
4
√
r log(4/δ)+log(4/δ)
ǫ . Let A ∈ Rn×d such that d < r and where the Euclidean norm of each row of A is upper
bounded by 1. Given that sd(A) ≥ w, the algorithm that picks an (r× n)-matrix R whose entries are i.i.d samples
from N (0, 1) and outputs RA is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Sheffet [She19] showed that adding noise matrix according to Wishart distribution preserves (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy. Sheffet [She19] considers the setting of Blocki et al. [BBDS12] and improve it. In Blocki
et al. [BBDS12], matrices A and A′ are neighboring if A − A′ is a rank-1 matrix with bounded norm (see
their abstract). This is our setting, too. Sheffet [She19] considers the presence or absence of an entire row
as neighboring relation (in the same manner as Dwork et al. [DTTZ14]). Hence, they have bounded row
assumption in their theorem. Their results also hold if we remove bounded row norm assumption and
consider A− A′ to be rank-1 with singular value 1, i.e., our setting.
To prove our lower bound, we give a reduction to the augmented indexing problem, AIND:
Definition 7. (AIND problem). Alice is given an N-bit string x and Bob is given an index ind ∈ [N] together with
xind+1, · · · , xN . The goal of Bob is to output xind.
The communication complexity for solving AIND is well known:
Theorem 13 (Miltersen et al. [MNSW95a]). The minimum number of bits of communication required to solve
AIND with probability 2/3 in one way communication model (the messages are sent either from Alice to Bob or from
Bob to Alice), is Ω(N). This lower bound holds even if the index ind and the string x is chosen uniformly at random.
C Spectral histogram Property and Private Spectral Approximation
The goal of this section is to show that the sufficient condition used in [BDM+20] only provides sub-optimal
accuracy. We also show a simplification of their analysis. For the sake of completion, we state their defini-
tion.
Definition 8 (Spectral histogram property [BDM+20]). A data structureD satisfy the spectral histogram prop-
erty if there exists an ℓ = poly(n, logW) such thatD satisfy the following conditions:
1. D consists of ℓ timestamps I := {t1, · · · , tℓ} and the corresponding PSD matrices S := {K1, · · · ,Kℓ}.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1, at least one of the following holds:
(a) If ti+1 = ti + 1, then (1− η)Ki 6 Ki+1.
(b) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 2:
i. (1− η)Ki  Ki+1.
ii. (1− η)Ki 6 Ki+2.
3. Let AW be the matrix formed by the windowW, then K2  A⊤WAW  K1.
We first show existence of an algorithm (UPDATE) that on takes a set of positive semidefinite matrices
not necessarily satisfying spectral histogram property as input and outputs a set of positive semidefinite
matrices satisfying spectral histogram property. The algorithm UPDATE performs a sequential check over
the current set of positive semidefinite matrices and removes all the matrices that do not satisfy the spectral
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Algorithm 6 UPDATE(DS)
Input: A data structure DS a set of positive semidefinite matrices {K(1), · · · ,K(ℓ)} such that
K(1)  K(2)  . . .  K(ℓ)
and corresponding a set of timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ.
Output: Updated set of positive semidefinite matrices K(1), · · · ,K(ℓ) and timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ.
1: for i = 1, · · · ℓ− 2
2: Find ⊲ Find spectrally close checkpoints.
j := max {p : (1− η)K(i)  K(p) ∧ (i < p ≤ ℓ− 1)} . (34)
3: Delete K(i+ 1), · · · ,K(j− 1). ⊲ It is important that we delete only up to index j− 1.
4: Set k=1
5: while i+ k ≤ ℓ
6: Update the checkpoints as follows:
K(i+ k) = K(j+ k− 1), ti+k = tj+k−1.
7: end
8: Update ℓ := ℓ+ i− j+ 1.
9: end
10: Return DSspectral := {(K(1), t1), . . . , (K(ℓ), tℓ)}.
histogram property. Since we make no assumption on the input except that they satisfy Loewner ordering,
it is possible that, in the worst case, all but one matrix can be deleted in step 3. However, as we will see
later, UPDATE will form a subroutine of our differentially private algorithms such that the input to UPDATE
will have a particular form on top of satisfying the Loewner ordering. This will help us utilize UPDATE in
a much better way. We being with showing the following for UPDATE algorithm
Lemma 10 (Spectral histogram property). Let DS = {(K(1), t1), . . . , (K(ℓ), tℓ)} be a set consisting of times-
tamps and positive semidefinite matrices such that
K(1)  K(2)  . . .  K(ℓ)  0.
LetDSspectral ←UPDATE(DS) be the output of the algorithm defined in Algorithm 6. ThenUPDATE(·) is an efficient
algorithm and DSspectral satisfy spectral histogram property.
Proof Sketch of Lemma 10. The proof of the above lemma can be derived from Lemma 1 which states a more
general case of approximation. We give a short proof sketch below.
Consider a time epoch T and a succeeding time epoch T′ = T + 1. Let the data structure at time T be
DSpriv(T) and at time T′ be DSpriv(T′). Let ti be a timestamp in DSpriv(T) where i < ℓ . We can have two
cases: (i) There is no 1 ≤ j ≤ s such that t′j = ti and t′j+1 = ti+1, and (ii) There is a 1 ≤ j ≤ s such that t′j = ti
and t′j+1 = ti+1. In both cases, spectral histogram property follows from the update rules. This is because
we delete indices up to j− 1 in Step 3 and the maximality of the index j in Algorithm 6.
We next give an intuition why we need this lemma. Lemma 10 gives the guarantee that, if we are given
a set of positive semidefinite matrices in Loewner ordering, then we can efficiently maintain a small set
of positive semidefinite matrices that satisfy η-approximate spectral histogram property. The idea of our
algorithm for spectral approximation is to ensure that UPDATE always receives a set of positive semidefinite
matrices. This is attained by our algorithm PRIV-INITIALIZE, described in Algorithm 7. PRIV-INITIALIZE
gets as input a new row and updates all the matrices in the current data structure.
We use both these subroutines in our main algorithm, SLIDING-PRIV. SLIDING-PRIV receives a stream
of rows and call these two subroutines on every new update. Equipped with Lemma 10, we show that
SLIDING-PRIV, described in Algorithm 8, provides the following guarantee.
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Algorithm 7 PRIV-INITIALIZE(DSpriv; at; t; (ǫ, δ);W; r)
Input: A new row at ∈ Rd, a data structure DSpriv storing a set of timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ and set of matrices
K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ+ 1),
current time t, privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), and window sizeW.
Output: Updated matrices K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ+ 1) and timestamps t1, · · · , tℓ.
1: if t2 < t−W + 1
2: Set tj = tj+1, K˜(j) := K˜(j+ 1) for 1 ≤ j ≤ s− 1 ⊲ Delete the expired timestamp.
3: end
4: Set tℓ+1 = t, sample
R ∼Wisd(τ,1d), where τ ≥
⌊
d+
14
ǫ2
log(1/δ)
⌋
.
5: Define K˜(ℓ+ 1) = a⊤t at + R.
6: Include DSpriv ← DSpriv ∪ (K˜(ℓ+ 1), t).
7: for i = 2, . . . , ℓ
8: Compute K˜(i) ← K˜(i) + a⊤t at. ⊲ Update the matrices.
9: end
10: Find j := min {p : K(p) 6 K(ℓ)}.
11: Delete K(p), · · · ,K(ℓ− 1)
12: Update K(p) = K(ℓ), ℓ = p. ⊲Mantain PSD ordering.
13: Return DSpriv :=
{
(K˜(i), ti)
}ℓ
i=1
.
Theorem 14 (Private spectral approximation under sliding window). Given the privacy parameter ǫ, window
size W, approximation parameter β, let S = (at)t>0 be the stream such that at ∈ Rd. Further define AW to be the
matrix formed at time T by the last W updates. Then we have the following:
1. SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W), described in Algorithm 8, is (ǫ, δ)-differential private.
2. C˜ ←SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W) satisfies the following:
Pr
[(
A⊤WAW − (cτ log τ)1d
)
 C˜ 
(
1
(1− η)A
⊤
WAW + (Cτ log τ)1d
)]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
for constants c,C > 1 and τ := d+ 14 log(4/δ)
ǫ2
.
3. The space required by SLIDING-PRIV is O
(
d3
η logW
)
.
Proof of Theorem 14. Consider an index 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and the time epoch twhen the stream of rows are different
Algorithm 8 SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W)
Input: A stream, Ω, of row {at}, privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), and window sizeW.
Output: A positive semidefinite matrix C˜ at the end of the stream.
1: Initialize DSpriv to be an empty set, r = d.
2: while stream S has not ended
3: Include new row, DSpriv ← PRIV-INITIALIZE (DSpriv; at; t; (ǫ, δ);W; r). ⊲ Algorithm 7
4: Update the data structure, DSpriv ←UPDATE(DSpriv). ⊲ Algorithm 6
5: end
6: Let DSpriv =
{
(K˜(1), t1), . . . , (K˜(ℓ), tℓ)
}
for some ℓ.
7: Output C˜ = K˜(1).
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resulting in neighboring matrices A[ti,t] and A
′
[ti,t]
, we have
A⊤[ti,t]A[ti,t] − (A
′
[ti,t]
)⊤A′[ti,t] = u
⊤u,
where u is a unit row vector. That is A⊤[ti,t]A[ti,t] − (A
′
[ti,t]
)⊤A′[ti,t] is a rank-1 matrix. NowW ∼ Wisd(τ,1d).
LetP denote the output distribution of ourmechanismwhen run on the inputmatrix A[ti,t] and similarly
let Q denote the output of our algorithm on input matrix A′
[ti,t]
. Both distribution are supported on S :=
Rd×d matrices. For M ∈ S, consider the privacy loss function
L(M) := log
(P(M)
Q(M)
)
.
When T < t, the output distribution of P and Q are identical, i.e., L(M) = 0. When T = t, the privacy
proof follows by the choice of τ and Theorem 11. That is,
Pr[L(M) ≤ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ.
For any time T ≥ t, we have differential privacy because of the post-processing property (Lemma 9).
For the space bound, note that the number of checkpoints stored by DSpriv is O
(
d
η logW
)
. This is
because there are exactly d singular values and the matrix has polynomially bounded spectrum. Since at
each checkpoints defined by ti for i ≥ 1 stores an d× d matrix, the total space used by the data structure
DSpriv, and hence the algorithm SLIDING-PRIV, is O
(
d3
η logW
)
.
Now we turn our attention to the accuracy guarantee. We start by noting that the output of SLIDING-
PRIV(S; (ǫ, δ);W) is K˜(1), the first positive semidefinite matrix in the data structure DSpriv.
Let K(1) and K(2) denote the covariance matrix formed between time epochs [t1, T] and [t2, T], respec-
tively.Since the window is sandwiched between the first and second timestamp, and we preserve the posi-
tive semidefinite ordering, we have
K(2)  A⊤WAW  K(1). (35)
Let R(1) and R(2) be matrices sampled from the Wishart distribution such that
K˜(1) := K(1) + R(1) and K˜(2) := K(2) + R(2).
Note thatDSpriv stores the set
{
K˜(1), K˜(2), · · · , K˜(ℓ)
}
. From the spectral histogram property of the matrices
in DSpriv, we have the following relation between K˜(1) and K˜(2):
(1− η)A˜⊤ A˜ = (1− η)K˜(1)  K˜(2). (36)
Define
σ := τ log(τ) =
(
d+
log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
log
(
d+
log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
.
Using the standard result on the eigenvalue bounds of matrices sampled fromWishart distribution [Joh01,
Sos02], we have that λ1(R(1)) ≤ cσ and λ1(R(2)) ≤ cσ for some constant c > 1 with probability 1− 1poly(d) .
Also, since R(1) and R(2) are sampled from a Wishart distribution, they are positive semidefinite. There-
fore, we have
Pr
[
K(1)− c1σ1d  K˜(1)  K(1) + c1σ1d
]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
,
Pr
[
K(2)− c2σ1d  K˜(2)  K(2) + c2σ1d
]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
,
(37)
where K(1) is the underlying covariancematrix formed during the time epochs [t1, t], K(2) is the underlying
covariance matrix formed during the time epochs [t2, t], and c > 0 is a constant.
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We now condition on the event that Equation (37) holds for the rest of the proof. Let σ := τ log τ. Using
Equations (35), (36) and (37), we arrive at
(1− η) (K(1)− c1σ1d)  (1− η)K˜(1)
 K˜(2)  K(2) + c2σ1d
 A⊤WAW + c2σ1d
(38)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (38) gives us
K(1)  1
(1− η)A
⊤
WAW + c3σ1d, (39)
where c3 = c1 +
c2
(1−η) is a constant. Using Equation (39) in the right side positive semidefinite inequality of
Equation (37), we have
(K(1)− c1σ1d)  K˜(1)  1(1− η)A
⊤
WAW + c3σ1d. (40)
Using the left hand semidefinite inequality of Equation (35) in Equation (40), we get(
A⊤WAW − c1σ1d
)
 K˜(1)  1
(1− η)A
⊤
WAW + c3σ1d. (41)
Since C˜ = K˜(1) by the output of the algorithm, we have the desired bound.
C.1 Application of Algorithm 8: sub-optimal algorithms for private matrix analysis
Theorem 14 gives the guarantee that Algorithm 8 outputs a matrix that approximates the spectrum of
A⊤WAW up to a small additive error in the spectrum. This in particular means that Algorithm 8 can be
used to solve many matrix analysis problems; however, the accuracy guarantees are sub-optimal in many
cases. For every problem discussed in this appendix, we give a pointer to the improved bounds.
As a warm up, we consider directional variance queries. Theorem 15 is true for any d-dimensional unit
vector x ∈ Rd.
C.2 Directional Variance Queries
The directional variance queries has the following form: the analyst gives a unit-length vector x ∈ Rd and
wish to know the variance of AW along x. Using Theorem 11, we have the following result.
Theorem 15 (Directional variance queries). Let AW be the matrix formed by last W updates as defined in equa-
tion (1), η be the given approximation parameter, (ǫ, δ) be the privacy parameter. Then there is an efficient (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private algorithm that outputs a matrix C such that for any unit vector x ∈ Rd, we have
x⊤A⊤WAWx− c1τ log(τ) ≤ x⊤Cx ≤
1
(1− η) x
⊤A⊤WAWx+ c3τ log(τ),
where τ = d+ 14
ǫ2
log(4/δ).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Equation (41) and the fact that 〈x, x〉 = ‖x‖2 = 1.
A special case of directional variance queries is when at is the edges of a weighted graph, d = n, and the
query is of form {0, 1}n. Such a query is known as cut queries. Using Theorem 15, we have the following
result for answering cut queries.
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Corollary 2 (Cut queries). Let GW be the graph formed by last W updates as defined in equation (1). There is an
efficient (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm that outputs a matrix C such that for any cut query S ⊆ [n], we have
ΦS(GW)−
c|S|√τ log τ
ǫ
≤ OutS ≤ 1(1− η)ΦS(GW) +
c|S|√τ log τ
ǫ
,
where τ = n+ 14
ǫ2
log(4/δ) and OutS =
√
e⊤S CeS for eS := ∑i∈S e¯i.
Proof. The matrix C is the same as that generated in Theorem 15 and on a query, S ⊆ [n], we output
OutS =
√
e⊤S CeS, where eS := ∑
i∈S
e¯i.
Using Theorem 15 and the bound on the eigenvalue of Wishart matrices [Joh01], we have the result.
Note that this is better than the result of [BBDS12]. They achieved a multiplicative error of (1± η) and
additive bound of O
(
|S|
√
n log(1/δ)
ǫ log(1/δ)
)
for a cut query S.
In practice, it is not always feasible to ask all possible queries and only a polynomial number of queries.
In Section 4, we showed (Theorem 5) that we can get a better bound if we have an a priori bound q on the
number of queries an analyst can make.
C.3 Principal Component Analysis
Since Theorem 14 preserves the spectrum of the covariance matrix, it can be used for a variety of tasks
involving spectrum. In particular, we can use it to compute the principal component of the matrix streamed
in the window. Let Π be the set of all rank-k orthonormal projection matrices, i.e., every matrix P ∈ Π has
rank k and satisfy P2 = P and P = P⊤.
Now consider the following algorithm:
SLIDING-PCA
1. Compute A˜⊤ A˜←SLIDING-PRIV(S; (ǫ, δ);W).
2. Output
X˜ = argmin
P∈Π
{
Tr
(
(1d − P)⊤A˜⊤ A˜(1d − P)
)}
.
We note that the rank constrained problem in step 2 can be solved efficiently using the result of [Upa18]
and present a self-contained proof in Section B. We have the following result for the SLIDING-PCA algo-
rithm.
Theorem 16. Given privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) and approximation parameter η ∈ (0, 1/2), let AW be the matrix
formed by the last W updates as defined in equation (1) and Π be the set of all rank-k orthonormal projection matrices.
Then SLIDING-PCA is an efficient (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm that outputs a rank-k projection matrix
X˜ ∈ Rd×d such that
Pr
[∥∥∥AW(1d − X˜)∥∥∥2
F
≤ (1+ 2η)min
P∈Π ‖AW(1d − P)‖
2
F +O (dτ log(τ))
]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
,
where τ :=
(
d+ 14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
.
Proof. Let
X̂ := argmin
X∈Π
‖AW(1d − X)‖2F and X˜ := argmin
X∈Π
∥∥∥A˜(1d − X)∥∥∥2
F
. (42)
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Then from the optimality of X˜ and the fact that ‖Y‖2F = Tr
(
Y⊤Y
)
for any matrix Y, we have∥∥∥A˜(1d − X˜)∥∥∥2
F
≤
∥∥∥A˜(1d − X̂)∥∥∥2
F
= Tr
(
(1d − X̂)⊤ A˜⊤ A˜(1d − X̂)
)
.
Using the right hand side semidefinite inequality in Equation (41), we have∥∥∥A˜(1d − X˜)∥∥∥2
F
≤ 1
(1− η)Tr
(
(1d − X̂)⊤A⊤WAW(1d − X̂)
)
+ c(1d − X̂)⊤(1d − X̂)τ log(τ)
≤ 1
(1− η)
∥∥∥AW(1d − X̂)∥∥∥2
F
+ cd
(
d+
14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
log
(
d+
14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
=
1
(1− η) minX∈Π ‖AW(1d − X)‖
2
F + cd
(
d+
14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
log
(
d+
14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
. (43)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that (1d − X̂) is a rank d− k projection matrix and second
equality follows from equation (42).
Now using the left hand side inequality of Equation (41) and the fact that (1d − X̂) is a rank d − k
projection matrix, we have∥∥∥A˜(1d − X˜)∥∥∥2
F
= Tr
(
(1d − X˜)⊤A˜⊤ A˜(1d − X˜)
)
≥ Tr
(
(1d − X˜)⊤A⊤WAW(1d − X˜)
)
− c(1d − X˜)⊤(1d − X˜)τ log(τ)
≥
∥∥∥AW(1d − X˜)∥∥∥2
F
− cd
(
d+
14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
log
(
d+
14
ǫ2
log(4/δ)
)
. (44)
Combining equations (43) and (44), we have Theorem 16.
D Extension to continual release
Until now, we consider only one-shot algorithm, that is, an algorithm to compute spectral approximation
with additive error of O
(
cr log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
1d, but the output is produced just once. If we naively use this al-
gorithm to publish a matrix continually over the entire window, it would lead to a total accuracy loss of
O
(
crW log2(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
1d. In this section, we show an algorithm that computes spectral approximation with
small additive error over the entire window, i.e., o(Wτ).
The continual release model was proposed by Dwork et al. [DNPR10]. In contrast to our setting, contin-
ual release model consider the entire data useful and does not put any space constraints. We provide two
different protocols, in both of which we consider accuracy for only the update that came during the current
window.
The first approach uses the same binary tree method introduced by Bentley and Saxe [BS80] and used in
Dwork et al. [DNPR10] and Chan et al. [CSS11], and in the sliding window model by Bolot et al. [BFM+13]
and Upadhyay [Upa19]. However, we depart from their technique in the sense that we only build the
binary tree. Let aT−W+1, · · · , aT be the updates at any time T. In particular, we construct a binary tree as
follows:
1. Every leaves consists of a single update privatized using Step 5.
2. For every other node, n, other than the leaf nodes, let C be the set of updates on the leaves of the
subtree of n. Then we first compute
Sn = ∑
ai∈C
a⊤i ai
Then we store S˜n on the node n, where S˜n is formed using the privitization step (Step 5) on Sn.
36
This construction mimics the construction of Dwork et al. [DNPR10] and hence using their analysis, we
get the following result:
Theorem 17 (Private spectral approximation under sliding window). Given the privacy parameter ǫ, window
size W, approximation parameter β, let Ω = (at)t>0 be the stream such that at ∈ Rd. For every t > 0, define AW(t)
to be the matrix formed at time t by the last W updates. Then we have the following:
1. SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W), described in Algorithm 8, is (ǫ, δ)-differential private.
2. C˜ ←SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W) satisfies the following:
Pr
[
A⊤WAW − (cτ log τ)1d  C˜  A⊤WAW + (Cτ log τ)1d
]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
for constants c,C > 1 and τ :=
(
d+ 14 log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
log3/2 (W).
3. The space required by SLIDING-PRIV is O
(
d2W
η logW
)
.
Note that this result uses η-spectrogram property.
D.1 Making space requirement sublinear in window-size at the cost of accuracy loss
We now improve this bound by incurring an accuracy loss that scales only logarithmic in the window size
instead of linear. For this, we borrow the idea of Bentley and Saxe [BS80] to move from one-shot algorithms
to continually release algorithm. This technique was also used in Dwork et al. [DNPR10] and subsequently
improved in Chan et al. [CSS11] and Bolot et al. [BFM+13]. The idea is to build binary tree with leaves
being the matrix at the checkpoint. For this, we fix some notation:
1. B˜ be the binary tree formed by the leaves K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ).
2. B˜n be the subtree of the internal node, n, of the tree B˜.
3. L˜n be the leaves of B˜ in the subtree B˜n; i.e., a subset of the graphs K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ).
We divide our window in to
√
W sub-windows, each of size
√
W. We run an instantiation of our algo-
rithm for each of these subwindows. Let these subwindows terminates at timestamps T1, T2, · · · , T√W = T.
For j-th subwindow that terminates at time Tj, we also augment our data structure DSpriv for each of these
windows to contains the following:
1. A set of covariance matrix for every timestamps stored in the data structure in Section C. That is, for
timestamps, t1, · · · , tℓ, apart from the privatized covariance matrix, K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ) we also store K(i)
such that
K(i) =
Tj
∑
t=ti
a⊤t at for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
2. A binary tree formed using an algorithm BINARY-TREE that uses covariance matrices K(1), · · · ,K(ℓ)
and K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ). BINARY-TREE operates as follows:
(a) The leaves of the tree are K˜(1), · · · , K˜(ℓ).
(b) For every internal node, n, let Ln be the covariance matrix from the set {K(1), · · · ,K(ℓ)} corre-
sponding to the covariance matrices in the set L˜n. Then the covariance matrix stored in the node
n is the privatization of the following covariance matrix:
Kn = ∑
K˜(i)∈L˜n
K(i),
where the privatization is done as in Step 5.
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3. Delete all the internal nodes whose leaves contains covariance matrix is formed before time t1.
Since the number of checkpoints is ℓ = O
(
n
ρ logW
)
, combining Theorem 14 with that of Dwork et
al. [DNPR10], we have the following theorem:
Theorem 18 (Private spectral approximation under sliding window). Given the privacy parameter ǫ, window
size W, approximation parameter β, let Ω = (at)t>0 be the stream such that at ∈ Rd. For every t > 0, define AW(t)
to be the matrix formed at time t by the last W updates. Then we have the following:
1. SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W), described in Algorithm 8, is (ǫ, δ)-differential private.
2. C˜ ←SLIDING-PRIV(Ω; (ǫ, δ);W) satisfies the following:
Pr
[(
A⊤WAW − (cτ log τ)1d
)
 C˜ 
(
A⊤WAW
(1− η) + (Cτ log τ)1d
)]
≥ 1− 1
poly(d)
for constants c,C > 1 and τ :=
(
d+
14 log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
W3/4.
3. The space required by SLIDING-PRIV is O
(
d3
√
W
η logW
)
.
E Lower Bounds for Low-rank Approximation
This section is devoted to proving a lower bound on the space requirement for low-rank factorization with
non-trivial additive error. It is well known that no private algorithm (not necessarily differentially private)
incurs an additive error o(
√
kd) [HR12] due to linear reconstruction attack. On the other hand, the only
known space lower bound of [Upa18] holds for streaming data where the entire historic data is considered
important. While the entries can be streamed in an arbitrary order, this paper considers the case when one
row is streamed at a time. Hence, there might be a possibility to construct an improved space algorithm
for the special case of streaming we consider. However, we show below that for any non-trivial values of τ,
this is not the case.
We first note that the technique developed by Bar-Yossef [BY02] can be used to give lower bounds on
the number of rows to be sampled by any sampling-based algorithm for low-rank matrix approximation.
However, space lower bounds, in general, is a harder problem as one can use methods other than row sam-
pling. For example, Bar-Yossef [BY02] showed that any sampling-based algorithm for computing Euclidean
norm of a stream of lengthW requires Ω(W) samples, while Upadhyay [Upa19] gave a privacy-preserving
sliding window algorithm using O
(√
W log2W
η2
)
bits. Our lower bounds come from reduction from the
two-party communication complexity of augmented indexing, AIND problem [MNSW95b].
Theorem 19. Let n, d, k ∈ N and η > 0. Then the space used by any randomized single-pass algorithm for low-rank
approximation in the sliding window model is at least Ω(Wk log(W)/η).
Proof. For a matrix A and set of indices C, we use the notation A(C) to denote the submatrix formed by
the columns indexed by C. We use the standard extension of the proof of [Upa18] for the sliding window
model. The idea is basically for Alice to generate a stream with heavier weights on the more recent rows.
Then Bob simply discards the stream not in the lastW updates and use the rest of the state to compute the
value of xind as in the case of [Upa18]. Let ℓ =
logW
η . Suppose n ≥ d and let a = kℓ20η . Without loss of
generality, we can assume that a is at most d/2. We assume Alice has a string x ∈ {−1,+1}(W−a)a and Bob
has an index ind ∈ [(W − a)a]. The idea is to define the matrix A with high Frobenius norm. The matrix A
is the summation of the matrix A˜ constructed by Alice and A¯ constructed by Bob. We first define how Alice
and Bob construct the instant A = A˜+ A¯.
Alice constructs its matrix A˜ as follows.
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1. Alice partitions the set {1, · · · , a} in to ℓ disjoint sets I1, · · · , Iℓ such that
Ii := {(i− 1)a/ℓ+ 1, · · · ia/ℓ} .
2. Let M (Ii) be an (W − a)× aℓ matrix for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
3. Alice forms a bijection between entries of x and the entries of M in the following manner. Every entry
of M (Ii) is defined by a unique bit of x, i.e.,
M (Ii)j,k = (−1)xp(10)i, p =
(i− 1)(W − a)a
ℓ
+ (k− 1)(n− a) + j.
4. The matrix A˜ is now defined as follows.
A˜ =
(
0a×a 0a×(d−a)
M 0(n−a)×(d−a)
)
,
where M =
(
MI1 · · · MIℓ
)
.
Suppose Bob is given an index ind ∈ [(W − a)a] such that xind corresponds to the sub-matrix M (Iθ) for
some 1 ≤ θ ≤ ℓ. Then we can assume that Bob also knows every entry in the sub-matrix M (Iθ′) for θ′ > θ.
The idea is that Bob inserts a scaled identity matrix in the stream, where the scaling parameter γ is large
enough to make sure that most of the error of any randomized algorithm is due to other columns of A. As
we shall see later, we set the value of γ as a large polynomial in the approximation error of the algorithm.
Bob forms his matrix as follows:
1. Bob forms a second level partition of the columns ofM (Iθ) into equal size groups G1, · · · ,Ga/kℓ. There
exists a unique r such that xind maps to an entry in the sub-matrix formed by columns indexed by one
of the second level partition Gr.
2. Let C = {c, c+ 1, · · · , c+ k− 1} be the columns corresponding to the group of Iθ in which ind is
present.
3. Bob expires the stream of Alice except for the current window and stream in a matrix A¯ which is an
all-zero matrix, except for entries A¯c+i,c+i = γ for 0 ≤ i ≤ k− 1 and γ to be chosen later.
Let A be the algorithm that computes low-rank approximation under the turnstile model. Alice feeds
its matrix A˜ to A in the turnstile manner and send the state of the algorithm by the end of her feed to Bob.
Bob uses the state received by Alice and feed the algorithm A with its own matrix A¯ in a turnstile manner.
Therefore, the algorithm A gets as input a matrix A = A˜+ A¯ and it is required to output a rank-k matrix B
with additive error τ = O(W + d). We will show that any such output allows us to solve AIND. Denote by
A(C) the sub-matrix formed by the columns C := {c, c+ 1, · · · , c+ k− 1}.
Let us first understand the properties of the constructed matrix A. To compute the Frobenius norm
of this matrix, we need to consider two cases: the case for sub-matrices in which ind belongs, i.e, M (Ir),
and the rest of the matrix. For the sub-matrix corresponding to the columns indexed by C, the columns
of A (Iθ) have Euclidean length (γ2 + (n− a)100θ)1/2. For θ′ < θ, every columns have Euclidean norm
(a(n− a))1/210θ′ . Therefore, we have the following:
‖A− [A]k‖2F ≤
((a− k)(W − a)100θ
ℓ
+ ∑
θ′<θ
a(W − a)100θ′
ℓ
≤ ((a− k)(W − a)100
θ
ℓ
+
a(W − a)100θ
99ℓ
≤ 2 · (100)θWd/ℓ = τ
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In order to solve low-rank approximation, the algorithm needs to output a matrix B of rank at most k
such that, with probability 5/6 over its random coins,
‖A− B‖2F ≤
[
(1+ η)
√
τ+ τ
]2 ≤ 2(1+ η)τ + 2τ2
≤ 2τ+ 100θk(W − a)
(
1
10
+
1
99
)
+ 2τ2
≤ 4 · (100)θWd/ℓ+ 100
θk(n− a)
5
+ 2τ2
Let Ψ := 4 · (100)θWd/ℓ+ 100θk(W − a)
(
1
10 +
1
99
)
+ 2τ2. The proof idea is now to show the following:
Step 1. Columns of B corresponding to index set in C are linearly independent.
Step 2. Bound the error incurred by ‖A− B‖F in terms of the columns indexed by Gr.
The idea is to show that most of the error is due to the other columns in B; and therefore, sign in the
submatrix A(C) agrees with that of the signs of those in the submatrix B(C). This allows Bob to solve the
AIND problem as Bob can just output the sign of the corresponding position. Let
R := {ra/k+ 1, · · · , (r+ 1)a/k} and C := {c, · · · , c+ k− 1} .
Let Y be the submatrix of B formed by the rows indexed by R and columns indexed by C.
Columns of B are linearly independent. The following lemma proves that when γ is large enough, then
the columns of B corresponding to index set C are linearly independent.
Lemma 11. Let B(C) := [B:c · · · B:c+k−1] be the columns corresponding to the sub-matrix formed by columns
c, · · · , c+ k− 1 of B. If γ ≥ 2Ψ2, then the columns of B(C) spans the column space of [A]k.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by considering the k× k sub-matrix, say Y. Recall that Y is a submatrix of
B formed by the rows indexed by R and the columns indexed by C. For the sake of brevity and abuse of
notation, let us denote the restriction of B to this sub-matrix Y := [Y:1, · · · ,Y:k]. In what follows, we prove
a stronger claim that the submatrix Y is a rank-k matrix.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that the vectors {Y:1, · · · ,Y:k} are linearly dependent. In other
words, there exists a vector Y:i and real numbers a1, · · · , ak, not all of which are identically zero, such that
Y:i =
k
∑
j=1,j 6=i
ajY:j.
From the construction, since Bob inserts a sub-matrix γ1k, we know that
k
∑
j=1
(Yj,j − γ)2 ≤ ‖A− B‖2F ≤ Ψ. (45)
k
∑
j=1
∑
p 6=j
Y2p,j ≤ ‖A− B‖2F ≤ Ψ. (46)
From equation (45) and choice of γ, for all j, we have Yj,j ≥ Ψ2. Further, equation (46) implies that Yp,j ≤√
Ψ. We have
Yi,i =
k
∑
j=1,j 6=i
ajYi,j ≥ Ψ2
imply that there is an p ∈ {1, · · · , k} \ {i} such that |ap| ≥ Ψ2
k
√
Ψ
.
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Let î be the index in {1, · · · , k} \ {i} for which |aî| attains the maximum value. We have |aîŶi,̂i| ≥ |aî|Ψ2
and |ajŶi,j| ≤ |aî|
√
Ψ. Now consider the î-entry of Y:i. Note that î 6= i. Since Ψ depends quadratically on m
and τ, we have ∣∣∣∣∣ k∑
j=1,j 6=i
ajŶi,j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ |a|(Ψ2 − k√Ψ) ≥ (Ψ2 − k√Ψ) Ψ2k√Ψ > √Ψ.
This is a contradiction because for p 6= j, Yp,j ≤
√
Ψ (equation (46)). This finishes the proof.
For the sake of brevity, let V:1, · · · ,V:k be the columns of B(C) and V˜:1, · · · , V˜:k be the restriction of
these column vectors to the rows a+ 1, · · · ,m. In other words, vectors V˜:1, · · · , V˜:k are the column vectors
corresponding to the columns in M. We showed in Lemma 11 that the columns B(C) spans the column
space of B. We can assume that the last n− a columns of B are all zero vectors because B is a rank-kmatrix.
We can also assume without any loss of generality that, except for the entries in the row indexed by R,
all the other entries of B(C) are zero. This is because we have shown in Lemma 11, we showed that the
submatrix of B(C) formed by rows indexed by R and columns indexed by C have rank k.
Now any row i of B can be therefore represented as ∑ ηi,jV:j, for real numbers ηi,j, not all of which are
identically zero. The following lemma proves part (ii) of our proof idea. For
Lemma 12. Let V:1, · · · ,V:k be as defined above. Then column i of B can be written as linear combination of real
numbers ηi,1, · · · ηi,k of the vectors V:1, · · · ,V:k such that, for all j and i ∈ R, η2i,j ≤ 4/Ψ3.
Proof. Let M:1, · · ·M:a be the columns of M, where M is the (W − a) × a submatrix of the matrix A˜ corre-
sponding to the input of Alice. We have
Ψ ≥ ‖A− B‖2F
k
∑
i=1
(γ−Vr(a/k)+i,i)2 +
k
∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
V2r(a/k)+i,j+
k
∑
i=1
‖M:r(a/k)+i− V˜:i‖2
+ ∑
i/∈R
k
∑
j=1
ηi,jVra/k+j,j + ∑
j′ 6=j
ηi,j′Vra/k+j,j′
2 + ∑
i/∈R
∥∥∥∥∥M:i − k∑
j=1
ηi,jV˜:j
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
As in the proof of Lemma 11, we have |V2
r(a/k)+i,j| ≤
√
Ψ and |Vr(a/k)+i,i| ≥ Ψ2. Let ji be the index such
that |ηi,ji | is the maximum. Then the above expression is at least |ηi,ji |2(Ψ2 − k
√
Ψ)2 ≥ |ηi,ji |2Ψ4/4. Since
this is less than Ψ, the result follows from the definition of ji.
We can now complete the proof. First note that since M is a signed matrix, each V˜i in the third term of
the above expression is at least
√
Ψ. Therefore, for all i /∈ S and all j∣∣∣∣∣ k∑
j=1
ηi,jV˜:j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4kΨ1/2Ψ3/2 = 4kΨ .
As M:i is a sign vector and if τ = O(m+ n) = O(m), this implies that
∑
i/∈R
∥∥∥∥∥M:i − k∑
j=1
ηi,jV˜:j
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ ∑
i/∈R
‖M:i‖2
(
1− 4k
Ψ
)
≥ O((100)θWd/ℓ)−O(100θa)
k
∑
i=1
∥∥∥M:r(a/k)+i− V˜:i∥∥∥2 = k∑
i=1
W−a
∑
j=1
(Mj,r(a/k)+i− (V˜i)j)2 ≤
100θk(W − a)
5
+O(100θa)
Now, since there are in total k(n − a) entries in the submatrix formed by the columns indexed by C,
at least 1 −
(
1
10 +
1
99 + o(1)
)
fraction of the entries have the property that the sign of Mj,ra/k+i matches
the sign of V˜j,i. Since ind is in one of the columns of M:ra/k+1, · · ·M:ra/k+k, with probability at least 1 −(
1
10 +
1
99 + o(1)
)
, if Bob outputs the sign of the corresponding entry in B, then Bob succeeds in solving
AIND. This gives a lower bound of Ω((W − a)a) = Ω(Wkℓ/η) space.
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